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Abstract 
Business support policies designed to raise employment and productivity are ubiquitous around the world. We 
exploit changes in the area-specific eligibility criteria for a major program to support jobs through investment 
subsidies. Pan-European state aid rules determine whether a sub-national geographical area is eligible for 
subsidies, and we construct instrumental variables for area (and plant) eligibility based on the estimated 
parameters of these rule changes. We find areas eligible for business support create significantly more jobs (and 
reduce unemployment), and this is not due to job displacement between eligible and ineligible areas. An 
exogenous ten-percentage point increase in an area’s maximum investment subsidy stimulates about a 7% 
increase in manufacturing employment. The treatment effect exists solely for small firms – large companies 
appear to “game” the system, accepting subsidies without increasing activity. There are positive effects on net 
entry of new plants, firm investment but no effects on Total Factor Productivity. 
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 INTRODUCTION 
The Great Recession brought industrial policy back into fashion.1  Governments around the 
world granted huge subsidies to private firms most dramatically in financial services, but also in 
other sectors like autos. Nevertheless, business support policies are not new – most governments 
offer business subsidies that claim to protect jobs, reduce unemployment and foster productivity, 
particularly in disadvantaged areas. For example, the US spends around $40-$50bn per annum on 
local development policies (Moretti, 2011). Despite the ubiquity of such schemes, rigorous micro-
econometric evaluations of the causal effect of these policies are rare.   
A major concern is that government programs might simply finance activities that firms would 
have undertaken in absence of the policy. The consensus among economists is that industrial 
policy usually fails, but the econometric evidence is surprisingly sparse. As Rodrik (2007) 
emphasizes, many of these policies are targeted on firms and industries that would be in difficulties 
in the absence of the program, so naïve OLS estimates may miss any positive effects.2  
We tackle the identification problem by exploiting a policy experiment that induced 
exogenous changes in the eligibility criteria governing whether plants in economically 
disadvantaged areas could receive investment subsidies. This program was called “Regional 
Selective Assistance” (RSA) and exists in all European Union (EU) countries in one form or 
another. Crucially for our identification strategy, there are strict rules governing the geographical 
areas that are eligible to receive aid from the UK government that are determined by the EU. This 
is different from the US where the Federal government cannot prevent states from offering such 
business inducements (e.g. Felix and Hines, 2013). These are common, formula-driven EU-wide 
rules and we focus on a major policy change in the year 2000 because we have detailed 
administrative and institutional data before and after the change. Holding area characteristics fixed 
in the pre-policy change period we exploit only the change in the EU-wide policy parameters to 
the different observable factors determining which geographical areas were defined to be more 
economically disadvantaged (e.g. unemployment and per capita GDP). This enables us to estimate 
the causal effect of the program on unemployment, employment, plant net entry, investment, and 
productivity. Our data set is constructed by linking rich administrative panel data on the population 
of UK plants and the population of RSA program participants. 
We reach four substantive conclusions. First, there is an economically large and statistically 
significant program effect - a 10 percentage point increase in an area’s rate of investment subsidy 
1 We us the term “Industrial policy” simply as a program that directs investment subsidies to private sector firms. In 
our context, these subsidies are a government attempt to revitalize disadvantaged geographical areas. 
2 For examples see Krueger and Tuncer (1982), Beason and Weinstein (1996) and Lawrence and Weinstein (2001).  
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causes about a 3% decrease in aggregate unemployment, an 8% increase in manufacturing 
employment and 2% increase in the number of plants. These effects are underestimated if 
endogeneity is ignored, as the areas that become eligible for the program are those which, on 
average, experience negative shocks and whose firms would otherwise perform badly, even in the 
absence of the policy. Second, we show that the positive micro effects are not simply due to 
substitution of jobs towards program participants and away from non-participants in the same area, 
or in neighboring (ineligible) areas. The new jobs created appear to come from the pool of 
unemployed workers living in the area, which is encouraging in terms of welfare. Third, we find 
that the positive treatment effect is confined to the establishments in smaller firms (e.g. with under 
50 workers). We suggest that this is due to larger firms being more able to “game” the system and 
take the subsidy without changing their behavior. Finally, there appear to be no additional effects 
on productivity after controlling for the program’s positive investment effects. Since larger and 
less productive plants are more likely to receive subsidies, this implies that the program lowers 
measured aggregate productivity because it increases the employment share of low productivity 
firms (e.g. Hsieh and Klenow, 2009).  
Our paper contributes to an emerging literature on the causal impact of place-based policies - 
see Kline and Moretti (2014a) for a survey and Kline and Moretti (2014b) on long-run effects on 
manufacturing jobs from the Tennessee Valley Authority policy. US Empowerment Zones - 
neighborhoods receiving substantial Federal assistance in the form of tax breaks and job subsidies 
- have been examined by Busso, Gregory and Kline (2013) who identify strong positive 
employment and wage effects, with only moderate deadweight losses.3  
We also relate to a broader literature concerning evaluations of business support policies and 
place-based interventions (see Neumark and Simpson, 2014 for a review). Several papers consider 
direct research subsidies to industrial R&D. Unlike the generally positive assessments on R&D 
tax credits (e.g. Fowkes et al, 2015), the evidence on these direct subsidies is mixed (e.g. the survey 
in Jaffe and Le, 2015).4 Several recent studies have used regression discontinuity design to assess 
the causal effects of direct grants. For example, both Howell (2015) on US SBIR and Bronzini and 
3 Holmes (1998), Albouy (2009) and Wilson (2009) consider other place-based tax policies, while Wren and Taylor 
(1999), Bronzini and de Blasio (2006), Martin et al (2011), Becker et al (2010, 2012a, b) provide evidence for regional 
policy in Europe. Gibbons, Overman and Sarvimaki (2011), and Einio and Overman (2015) discuss similar place 
based schemes in the UK, while Gobillon et al (2012) and Mayer et al (2013) provide estimates for France and Cerqua 
and Pellegrini (2014) for Italy. In contrast to RSA, which targets specific firms within eligible areas, these schemes 
are generally not discretionary (subject to the firm meeting some basic requirements). In addition to this substantive 
difference in the nature of the scheme, our paper is also unique in using exogenously imposed changes in area 
eligibility rules to identify the causal effects of the policy.   
4 See or Takalo et al (2013) or Einio (2014) for recent contributions. 
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Iachini (2014) on Italian data use a proposal’s application score by an independent committee as 
the running variable when analyzing the effects of receiving R&D subsidies. Interestingly, these 
studies are consistent with us in that they uncover much larger positive program effects on 
investment for small firms.5  
Our paper is not the first to look at the impact of the RSA program. Unfortunately, most of 
the previous evaluation studies are based on “industrial survey” techniques where senior managers 
at a sample of assisted firms are asked to give their subjective assessment of what the 
counterfactual situation would have been had they not received the grant (e.g. see National Audit 
Office, 2003, for a survey). In contrast to OLS approaches that are likely to underestimate the 
policy effect, these survey techniques are likely to over-estimate program impact since firms 
receiving money are likely to exaggerate the scheme’s benefits. Some other studies have also used 
firm-level econometric techniques to evaluate the direct impact of RSA.6  Relative to existing 
studies our contribution is to exploit a policy experiment on the population of plants to identify 
causal effects.  
Finally, there is a large literature on the impact of capital and labor taxes (e.g. Mirrlees, 2010). 
Unlike our RSA program, however, these general tax rules tend to be nation-wide rather than place 
specific, and general rather than at the discretion of an agency. They are more likely to engender 
general equilibrium effects than the RSA policy that amounts to only around 0.1% of aggregate 
UK investment. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section I describes the policy in more detail and 
outlines how eligibility changes over time. Section II sets out a simple theoretical framework and 
Section III describes the econometric modelling strategy. Section IV describes the data, Section V 
reports our results and Section VI provides some conclusions. In the online Appendices we report 
more details on the RSA policy (Appendix A), the changes in EU rules (Appendix B), data details 
(Appendix C) and issues in aggregation (Appendix D). 
5 By contrast, Jacob and Lefgren (2010) use a regression discontinuity design for US National Institute of Health 
grants and find no effect on academic productivity. 
6 For example, Devereux et al (2007) look at Greenfield investments by foreign-owned multinationals and UK-owned 
multi-plant groups using the largest RSA grant offers. They find positive, but quantitatively tiny effects on 
multinational location decisions. Hart et al (2008) also focus on multinationals using a Heckman selection model. 
Jones and Wren (2004) and Harris and Robinson (2005) look at differences in survival between RSA recipients and 
non-recipients.  
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I. INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK: DESCRIPTION OF THE REGIONAL SELECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE (RSA) PROGRAM 
I.A Overview  
Regional Selective Assistance started in 1972 and was the main business support scheme in the 
UK since the early 1980s. The program provided discretionary grants to firms in disadvantaged 
areas characterized by low levels of per capita GDP and high unemployment (“Assisted Areas”). 
It was designed to “create and safeguard employment” in the manufacturing sector. Firms applied 
to the government with investment projects they wished to finance such as building a new plant or 
modernizing an existing one. If successful, the government financed up to 35% of the investment 
project costs. 
Because RSA had the potential to distort competition and trade, it had to comply with 
European Union state aid legislation. European law, except in certain cases, prohibits this type of 
assistance. In particular, Article 87 of the Treaty of Amsterdam allows for state aid in support of 
the EU’s regional development objectives. The guidelines designate very deprived “Tier 1 Areas” 
in which higher rates of investment subsidy can be offered, and somewhat less deprived “Tier 2 
Areas” where lower subsidy rates were offered. There is an upper threshold called the Net Grant 
Equivalent (NGE)7, which sets a maximum proportion of a firm’s investment that can be 
subsidized by the government. These EU determined maximum subsidy rates differed over time 
and across geographical areas. 
Since the formula that determines which areas are eligible is set about every seven years by 
the European Commission for the whole of the EU and not by the UK government, this mitigates 
concern of policy endogeneity. Although the UK has latitude to decide the overall amount of the 
national annual budget for RSA, it must conform to the EU rules when deciding which areas are 
eligible to receive RSA. Changes to area-level eligibility are driven by EU wide policy parameters 
and are therefore the key form of identification in our paper. 
I.B Changes in eligibility over time 
We focus on the change in the map of the areas eligible for RSA in 2000 using the period between 
1997 and 2004, before and after the policy change. We also compare the results with those for 
longer periods. There have been changes in the area maps in 1984, 1993, 2000 and 2006. Our 
administrative data access does not extend beyond 2004 and we were unable to obtain precise 
7 The Net Grant Equivalent (NGE) of aid is the benefit accruing to the recipient from the grant after payment of taxes 
on company profits. RSA grants must be entered in the accounts as income and are made subject to tax. Details for 
calculations of NGEs are available in EU Official Journal C74/19 10.03.1998. 
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information on the criteria for being an assisted area before 1993, so we cannot construct the rules 
change IV for the 1993 changes (although we show OLS estimates in this earlier period).  
Figure 1 shows the maps of assistance in the pre-2000 period (left hand side) and post 2000 
period (right hand side). There was considerable change in the areas that could receive assistance 
and the level of subsidy they were able to receive. Whether an area is eligible for any RSA is 
determined by a series of quantitative indicators of disadvantage which were changed over time 
but always included per capita GDP and unemployment (both relative to the EU average).8 For the 
2000 change, the data used to determine which areas were eligible dated from 1998 and before. 
Although the EU publishes which indicators it uses, it does not give the exact policy parameters 
(“weights”) on these indicators which determine eligibility, but we can estimate these parameters 
econometrically (see sub-section IIIA).  
This institutional set-up implies that an area can switch eligibility status for at least three 
reasons. First, there may be a change over time in the indicators used or the relative importance 
(weights) of each indicator. Second, changes in the average EU GDP per capita can push areas in 
or out of eligibility even if nothing changes in the area itself. For example, when the formerly 
Communist states in Eastern Europe joined the EU, average EU GDP per capita fell, meaning 
some poorer UK areas were no longer eligible for subsidies. Third, the economic position of an 
area changes over time even for a fixed set of rules.  The first two reasons for eligibility changes 
are clearly exogenous to area unobservables, but the third is not. It helps that the information 
determining eligibility is pre-determined as it is lagged at least two years before the policy change 
and therefor man years prior to current outcomes. However, there may be unobservable area trends 
that are correlated with eligibility status and outcomes. Areas which are in long-run decline are 
more likely to have falling employment and investment and are therefore more likely to become 
eligible for the program, generating a downward bias on the program effect. Alternatively, there 
could be a temporary negative shock. This would increase the probability of an area becoming 
eligible, bit this would generate an upward bias on the treatment effect as the area mean reverts 
(an “Ashenfelter Dip” problem). To deal with endogeneity we focus on using only changes in the 
cross EU policy rules to construct instrumental variables for program participation and ignore all 
changes in area characteristics. As described more formally in sub-section III.A, we fix the area 
characteristics relevant for eligibility prior to the policy change and interact these with the changes 
in the EU wide policy parameters. 
8 See Table A3 for a full list of variables, definitions and some descriptive statistics on these variables. 
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I.C Formal criteria for receipt of RSA investment subsidies 
RSA was heavily targeted at the manufacturing sector – fewer than 10% of grants by value went 
to non-manufacturing firms. The grants were discretionary, and firms could only receive grants if 
the supported project was undertaken in an Assisted Area and involved capital expenditure on 
property, plant or machinery. These were the most clearly verifiable aspects. In addition the formal 
criteria stipulated that the project: (a) should be expected to lead to the creation of new employment 
or directly protect jobs of existing workers which would otherwise be lost and (b) would not have 
occurred in the absence of the government funding (“additionality”). Location, which forms the 
basis for our instrumental variable, is objective, clearly defined and enforceable. The other criteria 
are more subjective and are based on the government’s ability to assess the counterfactual situation 
of what would have happened in the absence of government support. For example, a firm could 
cut jobs but claim that it would have reduced employment by even more without support. It is 
difficult for bureaucrats to make such an assessment of this claim with any accuracy. The ability 
of a firm to “game” the system may be particularly high for larger firms who can increase 
employment at subsidized plants at the expense of employment in unsubsidized plants that did not 
receive RSA. 
II. MODELLING THE EFFECTS OF AN INVESTMENT SUBSIDY
II.A Effects of the RSA policy on Capital investment
What are the likely effects of RSA on investment and employment in an eligible area? Consider 
first the effects of a firm receiving RSA in a world with perfect capital markets. The investment 
grant ( ) reduces the cost of capital facing the firm. To calculate the magnitude of this effect we 
can use the Hall-Jorgenson cost of capital framework (e.g. King, 1974). We consider the effects 
of a perturbation in the path of a firm’s capital stock. If the firm is behaving optimally, then the 
change in after tax profits resulting from the one unit change in the capital stock will equal the unit 
cost of capital. Under RSA, depreciation allowances are granted on total investment, so we can 
write the cost of capital,  , as (e.g. Ruane, 1982): 
(1 )
1
r  
 

 
 

    (1) 
where   is the depreciation rate,  is the statutory corporate tax rate, r is the interest rate and   
is the depreciation allowance. It is clear from equation (1) that the cost of capital is falling in the 
generosity of the investment grant (
1
r
 

 
 
 < 0). Panel A of Figure 2 illustrates the possible 
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program effect by assuming that the level of the capital stock of a firm is determined from the 
intersection of capital demand (a downward sloping marginal revenue productivity of capital 
curve, MRPK) and a horizontal tax-adjusted user cost of capital (the supply of funds curve). 
Without any subsidy, the cost of capital is ρ1 and a firm’s capital stock is K1. The RSA program 
reduces the effective cost of capital to ρ2 and capital rises to K2.  
As discussed above, RSA attempts to target marginal investments. If only marginal capital 
projects obtain funding, the change in the capital stock is ΔK = K2 - K1 at a taxpayer cost of (K2 - 
K1) (ρ1 - ρ2). More realistically, the government has imperfect monitoring ability and so will 
achieve a lower increase in capital as some of the costs are diverted to funding infra-marginal 
investments that the firm would have made even in the absence of government intervention. The 
extreme case is where the government has zero monitoring ability and the firm simply accepts the 
subsidy for its infra-marginal investments. The level of capital stays at the same level, but there is 
a direct transfer of funds from the taxpayer to shareholders. The firm will not voluntarily make 
investments that earn a rate of return below the outside market cost of capital9 and can effectively 
lend out any excess subsidies at this market rate. It is likely that the government’s monitoring 
problem is particularly severe for large firms which will typically be conducting many different 
types of investments, and an outside agency will have difficulty in assessing whether any grant is 
truly additional or not.  
Now consider a world with imperfect capital markets such that we have a hierarchy of 
finance model (e.g. Bond and Van Reenen, 2007). Here a firm may be financially constrained if it 
must externally finance investment from debt or equity rather than relying on internal funds. In 
this case, the cost of capital/supply of funds curve is not horizontal as in Panel A, but becomes 
upward sloping when firms need external finance. This is illustrated in Panel B of Figure 2 where 
we consider two firms indicated by different MRPK curves. A financially unconstrained firm has 
a schedule “MRPK (unconstrained)” which intersects the flat part of the supply of funds curve, 
and can finance all investments from internal funds. By contrast, a financially constrained firm has 
schedule “MRPK (constrained)” and has to rely in part on more expensive external funds. An 
identical subsidy will generate more investment from the financially constrained firm than from 
the unconstrained firm.10 This is illustrated in Panel B of Figure 2 (ΔK’ > ΔK) and can be seen 
9  MRPK<
(1 )
1
r 





, i.e. the value of  in equation (1) when   = 0.
10 Note that the program is not simply directed lending which will only have an effect on financially constrained firms 
(e.g. Banerjee and Duflo, 2008), but rather a directed subsidy which in general will also have effects on financially 
unconstrained firms too. 
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from considering the cross partial derivative of equation (1): 
2 1
1r

 

 
  
 < 0. For firms facing 
an effective interest rate (r) higher than the risk free rate due to financing constraints, the marginal 
effect of a subsidy on the cost of capital is greater and so the effect on investment is larger. If small 
firms are more likely to be financially constrained, this is a second reason over and above lower 
monitoring difficulties why the program may have a larger treatment effects on small firms. As 
with the case of perfect financial markets, if the government cannot target marginal investments 
there will be zero effect on the financially unconstrained firms. 
II.B Effects of the RSA policy on labor
The previous sub-section focused on capital, but one of the objectives of the program is to raise 
employment. Consider as a benchmark a constant returns to scale production function F(K, L) 
where K  = capital and L = labor with perfect competition in all markets. What is the effect of a 
proportionate change in the user cost of capital, ρ, on labor demand? The Marshallian conditions 
for derived demand are (e.g. see Hamermesh, 1990) 
( )L Ks   
Where   =  is the elasticity of labor with respect to the user cost of capital,  = the 
Hicks-Allen elasticity of substitution between labor and capital, Ks  = the share of capital in total 
costs and η is the (absolute) price elasticity of product demand. The sign of the effect will depend 
on whether the scale effect (determined by η) is larger than the substitution effect (determined by
). The marginal effect of the investment subsidy is: 
ln ln
( )K
L
s

 
 
 
 
 
 
This shows that, in general, the subsidy could have a negative effect on employment, even if it 
increases capital. If    an increase in the investment subsidy will reduce labor. On the other 
hand, if    there is a positive effect on employment and the magnitude of this effect will be 
larger if capital is more important (high Ks ). This is something we will examine empirically. 
L
ln
ln

 L


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Total expenditure on RSA was about £164m per year in our sample period (see Table A2), which 
constitutes only a tiny fraction (0.065%) of total UK investment.11 Consequently, although there 
may be general equilibrium effects on asset prices and wages (e.g. Glaeser and Gottlieb, 2008) 
these are unlikely to be large. Nevertheless, since there may be some equilibrium price effects in 
local areas we also examine the effect of program participation on wages. We find these effects to 
be insignificantly different from zero.  
IID. Summary 
We take several predictions from the theory to the data. First, the investment subsidy should have 
positive effects on investment. Second, we may expect that the policy has a larger effect on small 
firms as: (i) big firms can more easily “game” the system by using RSA for investment they would 
have done anyhow; and (ii) because smaller firms are more likely to be financially constrained. 
Third, in the model the investment subsidy will have a positive effect on employment if scale 
effects are sufficiently large and the magnitude of any positive employment effect will be larger 
when the capital share is higher. We find support for all of these predictions in the data. 
III. ECONOMETRIC MODELLING STRATEGY
III.A Basic Approach and Identification Strategy
Our basic approach is to estimate the policy effects at a small-scale geographical area level. We 
also present results at a higher level – the travel to work areas (TTWAs) and lower levels of 
aggregation (plant and firm-level) which will help us assess some of the mechanisms around 
spillover effects (do jobs just get displaced from other areas?) and intensive vs. extensive margins 
of adjustment (i.e. incumbent expansion vs. net entry). There are 10,737 wards and 322 TTWAs 
in our dataset covering the whole of Great Britain (England, Wales and Scotland). Since the 
eligibility varies at the ward level and the number of wards is stable over time the ward is a natural 
unit of observation to focus on. We write the relationship of interest as: 
1rt rt r t rty NGE v      (2) 
Where rtNGE  is the key policy variable and is defined as the maximum investment subsidy 
available in ward area r in year t and ranges from zero to 35%. The main outcome, rty , we 
examine is employment – a variable which is available at all levels of aggregation. However, we 
11 For example, RSA expenditure as 0.065% of total investment in 2004. Table A2 shows RSA grants in aggregate of 
£148.5m compared to £227bn spent in gross fixed capital formation (ONS, 2014).  
IIC. General Equilibrium effects 
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also examine unemployment and entry/exit at the area level.12 Unemployment is useful to examine 
as we can assess whether increased employment is coming from other sectors (like services) or by 
drawing in people who were previously not working. The r  is an area fixed effect, t  are time 
dummies and rtv  is an error term. 
A concern with estimating equation (2) is that rtNGE could be endogenous if areas are 
selected into the policy because they have experienced negative shocks. As discussed in Section 
I, the level of maximum investment subsidy in an area depends on cross-EU rules. The areas which 
experienced a change in eligibility, as detailed in Table A1, may have done so because of 
unobserved contemporaneous changes in the area that are correlated with our outcome variables.  
To see this formally, denote eligibility in 2000 (and afterwards) as a discrete variable Sr,00 and 
similarly eligibility for the 1993-2000 period is Sr,93 . So ,rS  = 1 if the area is eligible in period 
𝜏 = (93,00) and zero otherwise. The EU rules are explicit that eligibility in 2000 depends on a 
vector of area characteristics such as unemployment and per capita GDP relative to the EU 
average. The EU also explicitly gives the period over which these data are dated which is from 
1998 and earlier due to lags in data collection. Similarly, the policy states the (lagged) 
characteristics used to define eligibility in 1993 (which were dated 1991 and earlier). Some of the 
characteristics determining 1993 eligibility were the same as 2000 and some were not. We define 
the superset of all the area characteristics relevant in 1993 and 2000 as 
,rX  . Therefore, the 
propensity of an area to be in 2000 can be written as: 
𝑆𝑟,00
∗ = 𝜃00𝑋𝑟,00 (3) 
The characteristics are area-specific (𝑋𝑟,00) but the policy parameters are (𝜃00) EU wide. 
Similarly, propensity to be eligible in 1993 is: 
93 ,93
*
,93 rrS X   (4) 
Now consider the change in the propensity to be eligible: 
00 ,00 93 ,93 00 93 ,93 ,00
* *
,93 93 00 93 ,00 ,93,00 ,93 ( ) ( ) ( )( )r r r r r rr rrS X X X X X XS X               
(5) 
The change in eligibility will depend on the changes in the policy parameters 00 93( )  and 
changes in area characteristics, 
,00 ,93( )r rX X . An obvious concern is that those areas that were 
12 Unlike the US, the UK National Statistics Office does not collect data on productivity, investment and wages at the 
plant level. The surveys are conducted at the firm (“reporting unit”) level, including for multi-plant firms. This means 
that we cannot calculate productivity measures at very detailed geographical level (e.g. ward). 
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declining may be more likely to become eligible for the policy and hence more likely to have 
worse outcomes. Consequently, we construct instrumental variables based solely on 
00 93 ,93( ) rX  , the leading term in equation (5) instead of the actual change in eligibility which is 
a function of 
,00 ,93( )r rX X . These are “synthetic instrumental variables” in the spirit of Gruber 
and Saez (2002) that should be purged of any suspected bias as they are constructed based solely 
on the rule changes and not changes in area characteristics. Note that since our main estimates are 
“within groups” where we estimate in levels with a full set of area dummies rather than first 
differences, the IV for NGE in equation (2) is 
, 00 93 ,93z ( )r t rX    if t ≥ 2000 and zero otherwise. 
We present many tests of the validity of the IV strategy including running placebos on pre-
policy periods. One tough test we implement is to estimate the reduced form of equation (2) in 
long-differences, but then condition on all the lagged levels of variables in the vector ,93rX so the 
IV is identified purely from the interaction terms. We will show that our results are robust even to 
this experiment. 
There are several practical issues in implementing this IV strategy (see Appendix B for more 
details). First, although the EU reveals what is in the X vector, it does not reveal the exact weights 
in  that determine eligibility. We know whether a particular element of X has a weight of zero, 
but not the exact value of the non-zero weights. Nevertheless, we can empirically recover the 
weights by estimating a regression equivalent of equations (3) and (4) from our data. With the 
estimated ˆ
 in hand we can assign changes to maximum subsidy rates (NGEs) to areas based on
00 93 ,93
ˆ ˆ( ) rX   rather than any (potentially endogenous) changes in characteristics. Also, recall 
that 
,93rX is based on variables dated no later than 1991, so we are effectively using information 
from 1991 (and earlier) to construct instruments for the 1997-2004 period. The identification is 
from a non-linear interaction between these long pre-determined characteristics and the policy 
parameters of the eligibility rule change. 
A second issue is that the maximum subsidy varies across the eligible areas (see Figure 1). 
For example, pre-2000 there were “Tier 1” areas with an NGE of 30% and “Tier 2” areas with an 
NGE of 20%.  To deal with this, we estimate the policy parameters by performing ordered probit 
models13 separately for 1993 (three grouped outcomes) and 2000 (six grouped outcomes14). We 
13 Nothing hinges on the particular distributional assumptions of the ordered probit. We have qualitatively similar 
results using ordered logits, OLS, etc. Appendix B discusses these alternatives. 
14 The six maximum subsidy rates after 2000 are 0 for ineligible areas, 10%, 15%, 20% and 30% for “Tier 2” areas 
and 35% for “Tier 1” areas. 

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use the 
,93rX  observables for both ordered probits. From the 
ˆ
 we calculate the probability that
an area will be in each subsidy regime in both pre and post 2000 periods. We then multiply these 
probabilities by the NGE in each regime to calculate an expected subsidy level for an area based 
on pre-1993 characteristics and the policy parameters. This is the IV used which varies by area 
and across the policy change solely due to the policy parameters. Estimating by ordered probit also 
means that all probabilities are bounded between zero and one, which is not the case for OLS 
regression versions of (3) and (4). 
Although the maximum investment subsidy (NGE) is an attractive treatment variable as it is 
the main EU policy variable, an alternative specification to equation (2) is to use the subsidy 
actually paid out to a firm. The advantage of using the actual subsidy is that it that it is more easily 
interpreted as “increasing the amount of dollar subsidies by 10% is associated with an increase of 
employment of y%”. The disadvantage of using RSA is that we do not know the exact timing of 
when the subsidies are paid after the first year of receipt. For these reasons, we present both NGE 
eligibility and RSA participation as treatment indicators in different tables of the empirical results. 
The 2000 map was based on electoral “wards” that are similar in population size to a US zip 
code. Our eligibility instrument is defined, therefore, at the ward level and we cluster standard 
errors at this level or higher. As an extension, we also estimate at a higher level (TTWA) to 
investigate cross-area spillover effects and disaggregate to the plant/firm level to look at treatment 
heterogeneity. We discuss econometric issues when we come to these results. 
IV. DATA AND ESTIMATING POLICY RULES
IV.A Datasets
Details on data are in Appendix C, but we summarize the most important factors here. We combine 
administrative data on program participants with official business performance data from the UK 
Census Bureau (Office of National statistics, ONS). Specifically, we match the Selective 
Assistance Management Information System (SAMIS) database, the Interdepartmental Business 
Register (IDBR) and the Annual Respondents Database (ARD).15  
SAMIS is the administrative database used to monitor RSA projects. It contains information 
on all program applications (almost 25,000) since RSA’s inception in 1972, and includes 
information on the name and address of the applicant, a project description, the amount applied 
for and the date of application. For successful applications, it provides the amount of subsidy and 
15 The IDBR is the equivalent of the US Economic Census but has less data fields: it is a business register. The 
manufacturing part of the ARD is similar in structure to the US Annual Survey of Manufacturing. 
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first date of payment.16 We match program participants with data from the population IDBR that 
includes addresses, industry, ownership and employment. The lowest level of data is at the 
business site level. The lowest level of aggregation we consider are all business sites of a particular 
firm in a ward that we refer to as a “plant”. This is because the unique business site identifier at 
the more disaggregated level is not always reliable.  
We matched 82% of all the RSA applicants between 1997 and 2004. The most common reason 
for non-matches is that the information on the SAMIS database is inadequately detailed to form a 
reliable match to the IDBR. To check for selection we conducted a detailed comparison of the 
characteristics of projects and project participants of matched with non-matched firms. All 
observable characteristics were balanced between the samples including application amounts, 
headquarter location, firm size and administrative location of agency analyzing the application 
(see Criscuolo et al., 2006). 
The ONS draws a stratified random sample of firms from the population of plants in the IDBR 
to form the ARD (Annual Respondents Database) which is a mandatory survey. Information in the 
ARD is gathered at a higher level of aggregation than a plant called the “reporting unit” which we 
refer to as a “firm”. Overall, 80% of firms are single-plant and located in a single mailing address. 
The ARD does not consist of the complete population of all UK manufacturing firms, since the 
sample is stratified with smaller businesses sampled randomly. However, it does contain the 
population of larger businesses, which cover 90% of total UK manufacturing employment. From 
the ARD we obtain information on investment, wages, and productivity of firms. 
IV.B Descriptive Statistics
Table A1 reports the number of areas and plants whose RSA eligibility status changed when the 
eligibility maps were re-drawn in 1993 and 2000. For the purposes of the table, we record a change 
in eligibility status for any change in the maximum investment subsidy rate. In 2000, 4,048 wards 
(out of 10,737) changed their maximum subsidy rate. Of these switchers, 1,424 areas and 14,967 
plants had an increase and 2,624 areas and 35,953 plants had a decrease.17  
Aggregate expenditure on the program was about £164m per year over our sample period, 
and since 2001 has been generally declining over time (see Table A2). On average, 28% of all 
16 Around 90% of applications were granted. There is information on applications not granted and we considered using 
these as a control group, but legal restrictions prevent us from matching these projects into the administrative data. 
17 By way of comparison, in 1993 only 1,893 wards changed status, with 1,034 enjoying an increase and 859 suffering 
a reduction. These changes in area eligibility affected 14,369 plants who saw their maximum subsidy increase, and 
8,856 plants who had a decrease in their maximum subsidy rate. 
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British wards are eligible for RSA accounting for 39% of manufacturing employment and 30% of 
manufacturing plants. Although, on average, only 3% of plants in eligible areas receive a new RSA 
grant in a given year, 18% of manufacturing employees have worked in a plant who received RSA 
at some point over our sample.  
We report some descriptive statistics in Table 1. Areas eligible for subsidies have more 
unemployment and a higher number of manufacturing workers than other areas. For example, in 
the 1997-1999 period the average ward had 267 manufacturing workers (Panel A) compared to 
351 in those areas eligible for RSA (Panel B). The average subsidy of a plant receiving a grant 
was just over £56,000 per year in the 1990s and just under £36,000 in the 2000s (Panel B). In 
2000-2004, an average plant has 20 employees (Panel C), although plants in eligible areas tend to 
be larger (27 employees). Panel D compares firms in eligible areas who receive subsidies with 
those who do not. Recipient firms are larger (87 vs. 31 workers), have 2.7% (= 0.042 - 0.015) 
lower TFP and 14% lower labor productivity (£38,600 vs. £44,900 value added per worker). Since 
the RSA program, like many industrial policies, targets larger and less productive firms, naïve 
OLS analyses are likely to underestimate any potential positive effects (Rodrik, 2007). Below we 
examine differences between plants belonging to larger firms (e.g. more than 50 employees) 
compared to smaller plants (e.g. 50 employees or less) and show that treatment effects are larger 
for the smaller firms.  
IV.C Estimating the Policy Rules
The estimates used to construct the policy rule are presented in columns (1) and (2) of Table 2 
(Table A3 has definitions and descriptive statistics). Note that three of the variables used as 
indicators in 2000 by policy-makers were not used in 1993 (the employment rate, the ILO 
unemployment rate and the share of manufacturing workers), so we set the coefficients on these 
variables to be zero. Similarly, there were five indicators that were used in 1993 but not in 2000: 
the share of high skilled workers, the start-up rate, the structural unemployment rate, the activity 
rate and the long-run unemployment rate. Again, we set the coefficients on these variables to be 
zero.  
Looking across Table 2, the signs are generally intuitive. Areas with lower GDP per capita, 
low population density, fewer skilled workers, low start-up rates, high structural unemployment 
rates, low activity rates and low employment rates are all significantly more likely to be eligible 
for higher subsidies. The only surprises are that the claimant count unemployment rate (in 1993) 
and the ILO unemployment rate (in 2000) take counter-intuitive negative signs. This seems to be 
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due to co-linearity among the many unemployment measures. In 1993 (2000) there are four (three) 
labor market indicators that are all highly correlated. We illustrate the co-linearity issue by 
estimating similar regressions with fewer unemployment variables. For 1993, when we drop 
structural unemployment, the results in column (3) show that the coefficient on the current 
unemployment rate takes its expected positive sign. For the period from 2000 onwards, column 
(4) shows that the coefficient on ILO unemployment also takes the expected positive sign when 
we drop the claimant count unemployment rate.18 
As discussed in sub-section IIIA we use the results from columns (1) and (2) to construct 
our IV for the policy: the predicted level of maximum investment subsidy based on pre-1993 area 
characteristics. The distribution of the level of the IV is shown in Panel A of Figure A1, and the 
change is in Panel B. There is a mass point close to zero in both levels and changes as most areas 
have a very low probability of being treated and this does not change over time (as in the actual 
data). However, the IV has positive mass over the entire support of the NGE distribution both in 
levels and in changes. Panel B shows an asymmetry with more areas predicted to lose eligibility 
than gain it, consistent with the actual change in eligibility reported in Table A1. 
V. RESULTS 
V.A Main Area Level (Ward) Results 
We first examine the area level results. Recall that our identification strategy uses exogenous 
policy rule changes that determine which wards are “randomized in” to be eligible (or ineligible) 
for support. We begin with unemployment counts because this is an overall measure of local 
performance, before moving to employment, which is the immediate target of the RSA policy. 
Figure 3 shows changes in unemployment for areas whose support levels were predicted to 
increase because of the policy rule change in 2000 – i.e. a discrete version of our instrumental 
variable - compared to areas where predicted support levels decreased.19 The 1997-2004 period 
was one of strong growth in the UK economy and unemployment was falling across the country 
(although there was a minor effect of the DotCom crash in 2001 as the rate of improvement 
slowed). It is clear though that there is a significantly faster fall in unemployment in the areas 
18 We checked that these co-linearity issues are not spuriously driving our key findings. We constructed the rule change 
instruments using the ordered probit estimates in Table 2 where exclude the problematic variables – i.e. current and 
residual unemployment rates - in all periods. Our results are robust to using these experiments. For example, the 
coefficient (standard error) on the IV estimates in the unemployment equation became -0.495(0.094) compared to -
0.318(0.064) in the baseline estimates of column (4) in Table 2, Panel A. We also obtain similar results when basing 
the instruments on ordered probits that included all indicators used in the either the 1993 or 2000 period. For example, 
the IV coefficient (standard error) becomes -0.595(0.057) in the same unemployment equation. 
19 There are no areas where predicted support levels stay precisely constant because the probabilities are continuous. 
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which where exogenously more likely to become eligible for investment subsidies after 2000 
(dashed line).  By 2004, these areas enjoyed falls in unemployment about 10% faster than 
elsewhere. By contrast, prior to 2000 the falls in unemployment were statistically identical across 
the two groups of areas. Figure 4 reports the same results for employment. Since this is for 
manufacturing, a sector in long-run decline, both lines are on a downward trend, but again there is 
no sign of significant differential trends prior to the 2000 policy change. The figure clearly 
suggests that employment fell significantly less in areas where predicted eligibility for investment 
subsidies increased after 2000 compared to those areas where predicted eligibility fell.20  
Table 3 reports the first area-level regression results. Panel A contains results for 
unemployment. In column (1), we report fixed effect regressions using the area’s maximum 
investment subsidy (NGE) as the main explanatory variable. There is a negative and significant 
correlation with unemployment: increasing the available investment subsidy by 10 percentage 
points is associated with a 1.7% reduction in unemployment. Because of endogeneity concerns 
column (2) presents the reduced form regression using our instrument – exogenous changes 
eligibility for subsidies using the change in EU wide policy parameters. There is the expected 
negative and significant sign on the IV as suggested by Figure 3. Column (3) reports the first stage 
regression with NGE as the outcome and shows that this is strongly predicted by our IV. The final 
column reports the IV results suggesting that the causal effect of RSA is actually about twice as 
larger as the OLS estimate of column (1). A 10 percentage point increase in support leads to a 
3.2% fall in unemployment. This is consistent with what we would expect: a positive shock to an 
area decreases the probability of it becoming eligible for investment subsidies, so OLS 
underestimates the unemployment reducing effects of the policy. 
In Panel B of Table 2 we present identical specifications, but use ln(employment) as the 
dependent variable. This is of independent interest as unemployment falls could in principle be 
into non-participation instead of jobs. In fact, the employment results are consistent with the 
unemployment regressions, suggesting that the policy is drawing more people into work in the 
affected areas. In Panel C we look at the extensive margin by using the number of plants as 
outcomes. Does the increase in jobs come from incumbents expanding or is part of it from higher 
net entry? The results suggest that at least part of the employment effect comes through increasing 
20 The standard errors are larger than in Figure 3 because we focus on employment in a sub-sample for where we also 
have micro-data (the universe of firms in the manufacturing sector). 
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the number of plants. For example, column (4) of Panel C implies that a 10 percentage point 
increase in investment subsidy eligibility causes a 2.2% increase in the number of plants.  
Table 4 reports the same set of regressions except that we use the ln(amount of subsidies 
spent in an area) as our main variable of interest. Hence, we can interpret the estimated coefficient 
as the elasticity of the outcome with respect to subsidy payments. We obtain qualitatively similar 
results to Table 3. For example, the final column in Panel B suggests that a 10% increase in subsidy 
spending leads to a 0.6% fall in unemployment, a 1.6% increase in jobs and a 0.4% increase in the 
number of plants.  
VB. Area level (Ward) Robustness Tests 
We conducted a large number of robustness tests, some of which we detail here. First, although 
Figures 3 and 4 do not suggest any spurious differential pre-2000 trends we also ran placebo tests 
where we introduced “pseudo policies” of the same form as RSA in the pre-2000 period. These 
were always insignificant. For example, we estimated the employment reduced form on the 1995-
2000 data but used the post-2000 policy instruments as if they were introduced in 1997. The IV 
has a coefficient (standard error) of 0.125(0.123) compared to 0.713(0.174) in the main 
specification in column (2) of Table 3 Panel B (see Table A5).  
Second, we estimated the regressions over a longer time period (from 1986 to 2004) which 
includes the policy change in 1993 as well as the one we use in 2000. Unfortunately, detailed 
information on the construction of the policy rules for the period before 1993 does not exist so we 
cannot construct the rule change instruments. Hence, we only run regressions of outcome variables 
on actual NGE support levels.21 We find coefficients implying that an increase of support intensity 
by 10 percentage points leads to a growth of 2.8% more jobs and 0.8% more plants. This is 
somewhat higher, but not significantly different from the earlier results using only the 2000 rule 
change (see Table A6). 
Third, we were concerned that there could be other policies conflating our main results. 
The only significant policy was EU “structural funds” which support infrastructure projects like 
roads and bridges.22 The map of supported areas also changed in 2000 and these are also focused 
21 Another limitation is that there is no consistent series of ward level unemployment for the period before 1996 so we 
just focus on employment.   
22 The structural funds are the financial tools the EU uses to implement EU regional policy (see 
http://ec.europa.eu/regional policy/en/funding/. Past evaluations report mixed results for the effect of structural funds. 
Recently Becker et al (2010, 2012a,b) have a more positive assessment using a better causal design. These positive 
effects are driven by regions with higher “absorptive capacity” (generally, regions that are richer and hence closer to 
the cut-off point for EU funding). 
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on disadvantaged areas. Fortunately, the areas that are eligible for structural funds are not all the 
same as the ones eligible for RSA. To address this issue, we re-estimated our regressions excluding 
all the 561 areas that had a change in their eligibility for structural funds after 2000. The results 
are robust to this experiment. For example, for this sub-sample the coefficients (standard errors)  
on the policy change IV in the reduced form of column (2) of Table 3 were -0.158(0.058), 
0.759(0.182) and 0.179(0.075) for unemployment, employment and number of plants 
respectively.23  
Fourth, we examined trimming the sample on a common support; i.e. we exclude 
observations that fall into the extremes of the distribution of employment and unemployment 
across wards. We successively drop larger bands from the edges of the distribution (1%, 5%, and 
10%). None of this has much effect on the estimates (last six columns of Table A6). 
Fifth, instead of estimating our models by including a full set of areas dummies (i.e. within 
groups) we controlled for the fixed effects by estimating differences. This leads to qualitatively 
similar results (see odd columns of Table A7). Importantly, the differenced specification also 
allows us easily to implement a very tough test of our identification strategy. We can estimate the 
equations of interest including the lagged levels of the area characteristics that were used to 
compute the rule change instrumental variable (in Table 2). The identification is solely from the 
non-linear interaction between the weights on the rules and lagged area characteristics. This 
addresses concerns that past (pre-1993) values of these characteristics might still be correlated 
with trends in our outcome variables over the year 2000 change. Our results suggest that this is not 
an issue. These additional controls have little effect on our results (even numbered columns of 
Table A7). 
Finally, there are several issues with the appropriate treatment of the standard errors. Since 
the instruments are generated regressors (from Table 2), formally we should allow for this in the 
calculation of the variance-covariance matrix. Doing so, however, made very little difference to 
the results as shown, for example, in Table A4. Consequently, we keep to the simpler method of 
simply clustering standard errors at the Ward level in most of the paper. A more conservative 
approach would be to allow for more spatial autocorrelation using. We tackle this in the next sub-
section by considering estimates at a higher level of aggregation. 
23 If we estimate on the full sample and include the EU structural fund eligibility dummy the coefficients are significant 
and take their expected signs. The signs and significance on the coefficients of RSA policy instruments continue to 
be the same, however. 
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VC. Higher levels of aggregation (TTWA) 
Comparison of the policy effects at the ward level and the more aggregate “Travel to Work Areas” 
(TTWA) level enables us to examine spillover effects across areas.24 When an area becomes 
eligible for investment subsidies firms may relocate jobs from neighboring ineligible areas. For 
example, consider two contiguous wards, r and r’, in a single TTWA (the example is easily 
generalized to r = 1, 2,... ,R contiguous wards). The ward employment regression can take the 
form: 
1 'rt rt r t r rty NGE NGE v     
Where the “spillover” coefficient   reflects the fact that a neighboring area that becomes eligible 
for RSA may cause employment to relocate away from ward r.  If we estimate the employment 
equation aggregating to the higher TTWA (subscript a) our equation becomes: 
at at a aty NGE v                                                           (6)
Where atNGE  is the average NGE in the two wards weighted by the lagged ward-level 
employment levels; i.e. '(1 )at rt rt rt r tNGE w NGE w NGE   where
1
1 ' 1
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rt r t
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
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 
  
 
. The 
coefficient on NGE in equation (6),  , captures the effect of NGE net of any negative between-
ward spillover effect. In Appendix D we show that 1 (1 )r rw w     . In the extreme case where 
the program simply causes shifting between areas (as Wilson, 2009, suggests for R&D tax credits 
across American states) the coefficient of NGE in equation (6) will be zero ( =0) for two 
symmetric wards. 
To construct TTWA level measures of investment subsidies we take weighted averages of the 
ward-level investment subsidies.25 If there are significant negative spillovers, estimates of policy 
effects at the TTWA level should be lower than at the disaggregated ward level. We replicate all 
the results from Table 3 at this higher level in Table 5. The qualitative results are similar and there 
is no evidence of any under-estimation of the results in Table 3. For example, the IV results in 
column (4) of Table 4 suggest that a 10 percentage point increase in support exposure of a TTWA 
leads to an 11% increase in employment (compared to 8.3% increase in our ward level 
regressions). Hence, in both cases the effect is, if anything, stronger than the ward level effect, 
24 A TTWA is similar to a US Commuting Zone. There is plenty of variation within a TTWA of ward eligibility. Post 
2000, in a TTWA with at least one eligible ward only 31.5% of wards had positive NGE. Post 2000 the number was 
35%. 
25 The weights are based on 1996 employment levels to mitigate any endogeneity concerns. 
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thus rejecting the hypothesis of negative effects on neighboring areas. It may actually be that 
revitalizing one area helps strengthen neighbors. 
VD. Plant level Results 
We also present results disaggregated to the plant-level for two reasons. First, it will reveal if the 
ward level effects found earlier are solely due to extensive margin effects – the net entry effect we 
showed in Panel C of Table 2 or if they are also driven by intensive margin effects (existing 
establishments expanding their employment). Secondly, it allows us to examine if there is 
heterogeneity in the response of different types of firms to the policy. The discussion in Section II 
implied that treatment effects could be more pronounced for smaller firms, so one observable 
source of heterogeneous treatment effects we examine is size. We use firm employment as a 
measure of size when splitting the plant sample as credit constraints or the gaming of the system 
depends on the size of the firm, not the plant per se (e.g. a ten worker factory owned by General 
Electric still benefits from GE’s deep pockets). In addition, to mitigate endogeneity biases we use 
the firm’s employment level in 1996 - the year before our estimation period (for firms born after 
1996 we use size in the first year and drop this observation from the estimation).  
Since we observe the population of manufacturing plants we can estimate for plant i the 
equation: 
it rt i t ity NGE v                                                                (7) 
This is the plant level analog of the area level equation (2). A plant is uniquely located in an area, 
r, and in a firm, j, but unless needed we suppress these sub-scripts for notational simplicity.26  
When moving from theory to implementation, one complication arises over the unit of 
observation in the data. Data on investment, output and materials come from the firm level rather 
than the plant-level.27 For most firms the firm level and plant-level coincide - on average 80% of 
our observations are single plant firms. Employment, our main outcome of interest, is always 
available at the plant level and we know the location of all plants within multi-plant firms. When 
we examine firm-level outcomes (such as investment) which are unavailable at the plant level, we 
simply aggregate the relevant equation across all plants within a firm. For firms, equation (2) 
becomes: 
jt jt jt j t jty NGE X v        (8) 
26 The large number of observations makes year-by-sector fixed effects infeasible for the estimations using the 
population. We can use year-by-sector fixed effects for the smaller ARD sub-sample and show robust results. 
27  We call this the firm level, j, but there could be many reporting units in one large firm.  
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For example, 
jty  is total firm employment, summing across all plants i in firm j, i.e. 
Table 6 presents ln(employment) regressions on the support intensity of the area where a 
plant is located. The results are qualitatively similar to those at the ward level in Table 2. Column 
(4) of Panel A implies that an increase of NGE by 10 percentage points leads to a 4.2% increase 
in plant level employment. This is about half of the figure found at the ward-level suggesting that 
both the intensive and extensive margin contribute to the ward level results. We also find a larger 
difference between the OLS and IV coefficients that is consistent with stronger selection effects 
at the plant level. It is not just the weaker areas that get help, but the struggling plants within the 
areas that are more likely to be selected for assistance. Hence, the OLS is a severe underestimate 
of the positive treatment effect at the plant level (indeed the OLS coefficient is not even 
significant).  
In Panels B and C of Table 6 we report regressions for plant level employment separately for 
small and large firms (firm level employment of less or more than 50 in 1996). The first stages are 
strong for both types of firms. The IV effect are positive and significant for plants in small firms 
but insignificant and under a third of the size for plants in big firms.28 This implies that plants that 
are part of small firms drove the aggregate area effect identified in Table 2.  
There could be at least two different reasons for the heterogeneity of the policy effect by firm 
size. Firstly, although large firms are often based in areas that receive support – hence the highly 
significant first stage in column (3) – the size of their grants is less generous. Alternatively, they 
are equally well supported, but the subsidies generate less jobs. Table 7 explores this by reporting 
regressions of employment on actual RSA support.  We show results using both a dummy variable 
for any support (participation: “RSA > 0”) and the amount of subsidy (“RSA subsidy”). Panels A 
and B perform this exercise pooled across plants from all firms and show that regardless of whether 
we use a dummy or continuous treatment indicator there is a large and significant positive effect 
of receiving investment subsidies when we estimate by IV and small effects when we estimate by 
OLS. Panels C and D repeat the exercise for plants from small firms (under 50 employees) and 
show that we obtain even stronger IV results. For example, in the final column of Panel D, 
employment of a plant in a small firm grew by 1.5% if it received 10% more investment subsidy. 
By contrast, in Panel F, a plant in a large firm would grow by only (a statistically insignificant) 
28 The effects are also significantly different at 10% level for large firms vs. small firms. 
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0.2% if it received 10% more subsidies.29 Note that first stage effects in column (2) for plants in 
large firms is highly significant – exposure to a higher support eligibility area matters. In fact, the 
coefficient on the IV in the first stage for plants in large firms is almost twice as large as that for 
plants in small firms (e.g. 0.454 vs. 0.237 in column (2) Panel E vs. C). Hence, these results are 
consistent with our second hypothesis - large firms receive equivalent subsidies but this support 
does not lead to as many jobs.30  
What could explain the different treatment effects between small and large firms? One 
possibility is that small firms might be (more) financially constrained than larger ones. With 
asymmetric information between borrower and lender, young firms will be at a disadvantage 
because the credit markets will have less time observe their performance. Recent evidence, 
however, stresses that although there is a correlation between youth and size, many small firms 
are not young (Haltiwanger et al, 2013). A simple test of the credit constraint hypothesis is to 
interact the treatment effects with firm age since younger firms are more likely to be subject to 
credit constraints. We run reduced form employment regressions where we include the linear rule 
change IV as well as two interactions between the instrument and (i) whether the firms is small 
and (ii) whether the firms is young. The interaction between the instrument and size is always 
significant and positive whereas the interaction between the instrument and being young is actually 
always significantly negative and this finding is robust to the exact measure of being young.31 
Since young firms respond less to the policy, the bigger program effect for small firms does not 
seem consistent with a financial constraints story. 
An alternative explanation of these results is that large firms might have more scope to “game” 
the system; i.e. receive the subsidy without actually being constraint by the requirements of the 
program to create jobs. For instance, they might have more scope pretend to create jobs while 
29 Could it be the case that despite smaller magnitudes the jobs effects for big firms are still larger as the smaller 
percentage effect applies to a larger employment base? We explore this by calculating the marginal effect of a £ of 
subsidy on the number of jobs. Denote   as the elasticity between jobs (L) and subsidies received ( ). Since 
lnL
ln





 the marginal effect is: 
L L

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


. Since we have estimated  in in column (3) of Table 7 separately by 
small (Panel D) and large (Panel F) firms, we can evaluate the marginal effect at the empirical mean subsidy and sizes 
for large and small firms separately. Small firms had on average 18 employees and £29,450 of subsidies whereas large 
firms had 211 employees and £107,190 subsidy. When we substitute these values in Table A8 we find that the marginal 
effect on jobs for £1,000 of subsidy remains over twice as big for small firms (0.090) than for large firms (0.035). 
30 In Table A9 we vary the exact definition of a “small” firm and show our results are robust. 
31 For example, in Tale A10 we included interaction between the IV and firms under 50 employees in the employment 
reduced form regression of Panel A column (2) of Table 6 which had a coefficient(standard error of 0.118(0.046). We 
then included a further interaction between the IV and firms who have only been alive for two years or less in this 
specification. It took a coefficient (standard error) of -0.081(0.007) and the size interaction remained positive and 
significant.  
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actually reducing employment in another location of the business.32 Although we do not have 
direct evidence of this, this explanation is consistent with the pattern of results described above. 
VE. Firm level Results: Employment, Capital and Productivity 
We report regressions at the firm level in Table 8, motivated by two considerations. First, it could 
be the case that the nationwide effect is zero if multi-plant firms are simply switching jobs within 
the firm across eligible and ineligible areas. Secondly, there is richer administrative data at the 
firm level including output, capital and materials for a stratified random subsample of firms - the 
ARD. Panel A reports employment regressions at the firm level using the IDBR population and 
showing that these are very similar to the plant level results, suggesting that within firm re-
allocation is not a major issue. In the other panels we use the ARD sub-sample that has information 
on other outcomes such as investment. In Panel B we report results for employment estimated 
using the ARD sub-sample and confirm our earlier finding of a positive causal impact on jobs.  In 
Panel C we find larger impacts on capital investment than we did for employment (although these 
results are slightly less significant) consistent with the simple theory model in Section II. Panel D 
shows that there is also an impact on output. Finally, Panel E uses a Solow residual based TFP 
measure and finds no significant effect of the policy (for more details see Appendix C). We looked 
at a variety of other methods of calculating TFP, but in no case do we find a significant impact on 
productivity (see Table A11). There was no significant program effects on wages.33  
Motivated by the theory in Section II – suggesting that more capital-intensive firms are more 
response to the policy - we interacted the treatment effect with a dummy for whether the firm had 
a high level of capital costs in revenue prior to the 2000 policy change. Consistent with the model 
firms where the capital share was high (big Ks ) had stronger positive employment effects. As 
shown in Table A13 (a generalization of column (2) in Table 7 Panel B) the interaction of the rule 
change IV and a dummy for high capital share firms had a coefficient(standard error) of 
0.461(0.209) in the employment reduced form. 
V.F Magnitudes 
The most straightforward way to consider the overall magnitude of the RSA policy effect is to use 
the area-level reduced forms. The treatment effect from column (2) of Table 3 Panel B is 0.713 
32 Recall that absent the requirement to create or safeguard jobs the RSA is effectively a subsidy to capital and might 
reduce optimal employment depending on the elasticity of substitution between labor and capital. 
33 For example, when we replaced the dependent variable by wages in the reduced form of column (2) the coefficient 
on the policy rule IV was 0.113 with a standard error of 0.099. 
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indicating that a 10 percentage point NGE investment subsidy would increase area-level 
manufacturing employment by 7.13%. Table A2 shows that there were about 1.04m workers in 
manufacturing in eligible areas over the sample period 1997-2004 and the mean level of the 
maximum investment subsidy is 23.8%. We estimate that about 176,000 extra jobs were created 
because of the policy (0.713*0.238*1.04m). The nominal average annual cost of RSA was about 
£164m. Using official estimates of administrative costs (17% of the aggregate grant value)34 and 
a deadweight cost of taxation of 50%, this implies a total annual cost of £288m, or a “cost per job” 
of £1,636 (=288/0.176) or $2,533. If we took the more conservative OLS estimates from column 
(1) which has a treatment effect of 0.169, the cost per job would be £6,885 (or $10,656). Since 
there do not appear to be large substitution effects from neighboring non-eligible areas, these do 
not need to be scaled down.35  
The cost per job is higher than for other labor market interventions in the welfare to work 
area, such as closer monitoring of unemployment insurance (e.g. Van Reenen, 2004; Black et al, 
2003), but it is much cheaper than most other polices towards under-performing areas such as 
government created jobs or untargeted tax breaks. The cost per job is, of course, far from a welfare 
calculation, as we are not factoring in other distortions such as the dampening effect on aggregate 
productivity of keeping open less productive firms. On the other hand, the government is also 
saving money from paying less out in unemployment benefits and other forms of welfare for 
workers who are drawn into employment. So overall, these calculations suggest a more positive 
assessment of this selective place-based industrial policy than the existing literature. 
V.G. Big Push: Asymmetries of subsidy removal? 
Recent work on place-based policies have emphasized that their long-run success depends on 
whether there are be dynamic effects (e.g. Kline and Moretti, 2014a). Is continued support needed 
in order to achieve lasting gains in employment or can a “big push” move an area into a new 
equilibrium were employment gains continue even after the subsidy has been removed? We found 
no evidence for the big push hypothesis in our data for manufacturing employment and net entry, 
34 We use the administrative reports of the grants awarded averaging £162.9m and add to this the estimations from the 
National Audit Office (2003) that there were 10% spent in government administration costs for RSA, and an average 
7% cost to firms in application and management costs. Note that our implied jobs effects are much larger than those 
found in the existing evaluations of the RSA policy surveyed National Audit Office (2003) and Wren (2005). We 
believe this is because no other study has exploited the exogenous changes in RSA eligibility to deal with the 
downward endogeneity bias. 
35 We are assuming that displacement is most likely to occur across neighboring areas. It is possible that displacement 
occurs from other areas of the UK, but it is likely that local displacement would be strongest. 
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nor for total unemployment. In one experiment, we defined a series of dummy variable for the 
amount and length of time that an area had received RSA support and interacted these with our 
treatment effects, but there was no significant heterogeneity in this dimension.36  
We also tried differentiating between areas that experienced an increase compared to a 
decrease in investment subsides 2000. We found that areas which lost subsidies had a significant 
decrease in jobs and that the magnitude of this job loss was broadly the same regardless of whether 
the area had benefited from being eligible for high subsidy levels for many years in the past.  The 
effects of a reduction in a big push area is not significantly different from a reduction in a non-big 
push area.37 
The absence of dynamic effects could be because the magnitude of the RSA policy is much 
less intense than the Tennessee Value Authority studied by Kline and Moretti (2014b) - it does not 
include infrastructure, for example. Nevertheless, our evidence does not seem supportive of the 
view that support of regions through these type of policies is likely to be transformational. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS
There are surprisingly few micro-econometric analyses of the causal effects of business support 
policies, despite their ubiquity across the world. In this paper, we have examined one business 
support policy – Regional Selective Assistance (RSA). We use exogenous changes in the eligibility 
of areas to receive investment subsidies driven by policy changes at the EU level determining 
which areas were eligible for investment subsidies. When we correct for endogeneity we find 
evidence for a positive treatment effect on jobs in the eligible areas and on employment and 
investment for treated firms. We also find that the program effects are strong for smaller firms but 
effectively zero for larger firms. This is consistent with large firms being able to “game” the system 
and/or financial constraints being unimportant for these firms (although we do not find much 
36 For example, we created a dummy variable equal to one if an area received the maximum investment subsidy rate 
(NGE=30%) continuously between 1986 and 1999 (and zero otherwise) and interacted this with our rule change 
instrument. When included in the employment regression of column (3) of Table A7 (alongside the linear dummy), 
this interaction variable had an insignificant coefficient (standard error) of 0.486 (0.429).  
37 For example, we ran regressions of the form: 𝛥 ln 𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑟𝑡 = 𝛽1 (𝐵𝑃𝑟 ∗ [𝐼{𝛥𝑧𝑟 ≤ 0} × 𝛥𝑧𝑟]) + 𝛽2(𝐼{𝛥𝑧𝑟 ≤ 0} ∗
𝛥𝑧𝑟) +  𝛽3( 𝐵𝑃𝑟 ∗ [𝐼{𝛥𝑧𝑡 > 0} ∗ 𝛥𝑧𝑟]) + 𝛽4(𝐼{𝛥𝑧𝑟 > 0} ∗ 𝛥𝑧𝑟) + 𝛽5𝐵𝑃𝑟 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝜖𝑟𝑡 where 𝛥 ln 𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑟𝑡 =
ln 𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑟𝑡 − ln 𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑟1997, BP = 1 if an area had maximum support (NGE=30%) for the years 1986-1999 and zero
otherwise, 𝐼{𝛥𝑧𝑟 ≤ 0} is an indicator variable equal to one if the instrument falls in value – i.e. an area is predicted to
have a decrease in subsidy levels for exogenous reasons. The test of whether removing support from (i) an area which 
has been supported for many years vs. (ii) other types of areas that have been less generously supported is: 𝛽1 + 𝛽2 =
𝛽3 + 𝛽4. We could not reject the hypothesis that the effects were identical between “Big Push” areas and all others –
the F-statistic was 1.41 with a p-value of 0.23.  
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evidence for this latter hypothesis). Interestingly, this stronger effect of business support policies 
on smaller firms is found in many other studies.38 The fact that the treatment effect is confined to 
smaller firms strengthens arguments for restricting subsidies that go to larger enterprises.  
At the area level we also find that the program reduced unemployment and raised employment 
both through the intensive and extensive (number of firms) margin. The positive effects on 
participants’ employment was not due to equal and offsetting falls in employment in non-
participants, non-eligible neighboring areas or sectors who were not covered by the scheme. 
Finally, we find no effects on (total factor) productivity. From a policy perspective, the fact that 
the subsidies were effective in raising employment and investment in these deprived areas at a 
modest “cost per job” should be regarded as a positive outcome.  Although measured aggregate 
productivity falls as the RSA supported firms were on average less productive, this probably 
carries a modest welfare cost compared to the counterfactual where these employees enter 
unemployment (rather than be reallocated to firms that are more productive). 
In terms of future work, an important question is whether these types of policies can 
permanently improve the position of disadvantaged areas through agglomeration effects. This 
requires investigating the longer-run dynamic effects of such policies after subsidies from an area 
are withdrawn, which is an avenue we are currently pursuing (see Kline and Moretti, 2014b). 
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Figure 1:  The Change in the level of maximum investment subsidy (NGE) between 1993 (left hand side) and 2000 (right hand side) 
Notes: The shaded areas are those that are eligible for some Regional Selective Assistance. In the 1984-1993 period, the dark shaded areas are the very deprived areas eligible 
for an investment subsidy of up to 30% NGE (Net Grant Equivalent, the maximum investment subsidy). The light shaded areas are eligible for up to 20% NGE. After 2000 
Tier 1 areas had 35% NGE and Tier 2 areas ranged between 10% and 35%. 
Source: Department of Business, Innovation and Skills “Industrial Development Reports”, various years.
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Figure 2: Effects of the RSA policy on capital 
Panel A – Perfect Capital Markets 
Panel B – Imperfect Capital Markets 
Notes: These figures examine the theoretical effect of the RSA policy reducing the cost of capital with perfect 
capital markets (Panel A) and imperfect capital markets (Panel B). For affected firms this is likely to raise capital, 
but the extent to which it does so will depend on a variety of factors such as whether a firm is financially 
constrained or more closely monitored (see text). 
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Figure 3: Changes in unemployment in areas with increasing vs. 
decreasing support probability 
Notes: Average changes relative to base year of 1997 in ln(number of unemployed) in a geographical area 
(“ward”). The hashed line shows average unemployment in wards that had an increase in support (as predicted by 
our rule change IV). The solid line is average unemployment in wards that had a decrease in support (as predicted 
by our rule change IV). 95% confidence bands also shown. Unemployment is measured by those claiming 
Unemployment Insurance (Job Seekers Allowance). The vertical line in 2000 shows when the change in policy 
occurred. 
Figure 4: Changes in manufacturing employment in areas with increasing 
vs. decreasing support probability   
Notes: Average changes relative to base year of 1997 in ln(employed) in a geographical area (“ward”). The hashed 
line shows average employment in wards that had an increase in support (as predicted by our rule change IV). 
The solid line is average manufacturing employment in wards that had a decrease in support (as predicted by our 
rule change IV).  95% confidence bands also shown. The vertical line in 2000 shows when the change in policy 
occurred. 
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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics 
Years Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Obs. #Units 
Panel A. All areas 
NGE (Maximum Investment Subsidy 
%) 
97-99 0.1 0.1 32,211 10,737 
00-04 0.1 0.1 53,685 10,737 
Average RSA Payment (£) 97-99 18,265.2 197,955 32,211 10,737 
00-04 9,837.1 134,036 53,685 10,737 
Total Unemployment (claimant count) 97-99 113.5 150.6 32,211 10,737 
00-04 80.9 112.5 53,685 10,737 
Manufacturing Employment 97-99 267.4 626.2 32,211 10,737 
00-04 233.0 535.9 53,685 10,737 
Panel B. Areas Eligible for RSA subsidies 
NGE (Maximum Investment Subsidy 
%) 97-99 0.2413 0.0492 10,284 
3,428 
00-04 0.2367 0.08896 14,040 2,808 
Average RSA Payment (£) 97-99 56,132.2 346,827 10,284 3,428 
00-04 35,712.8 260,039 14,040 2,808 
Total Unemployment (claimant count) 97-99 161.85 179.04 10,284 3,428 
00-04 123.85 147.95 14,040 2,808 
Manufacturing Employment 97-99 350.96 823.91 10,284 3,428 
00-04 338.10 745.40 14,040 2,808 
Panel C. Plant –Level 
Plant employment across all areas 97-99 21.2 102.30 406,615 167,415 
00-04 19.8 91.90 631,089 183,061 
Plant employment across eligible areas 97-99 27.4 139.00 131,431 53,575 
00-04 26.8 125.85 176,902 50,926 
Panel D. Characteristics of recipients and non-recipients in eligible areas (£), Firms 
Employment of recipients  97-04 87.2 323.4 16,413 4,550 
Employment of non- recipients  97-04 31,3 199.6 188,899 39.308 
Investment of recipients  97-04 1,717.0 105,686 3048 1,488 
Investment of non- recipients  97-04 953.3 8,001 15,314 7,449 
(Value added/ worker) - recipients   97-04 38.6 25.8 3048 1,488 
(Value added/worker) non recipients 97-04 44.9 231.51 15,314 7,449 
TFP of recipients (Indexed to industry 
× year average in logs) 
  97-04 
-.042 
0.371 3,048 1,488 
TFP of non- recipients (Indexed to 
industry × year average in logs) 
97-04 
-.015 0.414 
15,314 7,449 
Notes: TFP is computed using a Solow residual “factor share” method and relative to an industry × year average 
(see Appendix C). 
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Table 2: Estimates of parameters on eligibility rule changes 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Main specification Restricted variables  
 Year 1993 2000 1993 2000 
Dependent Variable: level of NGE ordered variable 
GDP per capita -0.022*** -0.047*** -0.034*** -0.058*** 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Population density -0.028*** -0.042*** -0.043*** -0.013*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Share of high skilled workers -0.586*** -0.910*** 
(0.139) (0.137) 
Start-up  rate -2.483*** -0.570*** 
(0.194) (0.174) 
Structural  unemployment rate 83.079*** 
(2.354) 
Activity rate -1.129*** -1.219*** 
(0.257) (0.236) 
Employment rate -9.134*** -12.108*** 
(0.462) (0.447) 
Current unemployment rate -9.163*** 62.192*** 83.867*** 
(claimant count) (3.209) (2.244) (2.030) 
ILO unemployment  rate  -6.364*** 0.257 
(0.847) (0.798) 
Long-duration unemployment  0.421 5.436*** 
Rate (1.246) (1.167) 
Share of manufacturing workers -0.263 -0.518*** 
(0.193) (0.197) 
Observations (wards) 10,737 10,737 10,737 10,737 
Cut-off 10% -8.662*** -13.517*** 
(0.436) (0.324) 
Cut-off 15% -8.590*** -13.452*** 
(0.438) (0.326) 
Cut-off 20% 0.000 -8.135*** 0.163 -13.038*** 
(0.226) (0.437) (0.218) (0.323) 
Cut-off 30% 1.198*** -7.484*** 1.359*** -12.451*** 
(0.226) (0.433) (0.217) (0.317) 
Cut-off 35% -7.352*** -12.327*** 
(0.433) (0.316) 
Log Likelihood -5,534.825 -7,098.669 -5,538.835 -7,509.456 
Notes: Coefficients (robust standard errors) from Ordered Probits of NGE maximum support categories for 1993 
and 2000. Dependent variable in columns (1) and (3) takes values of 1 to 3 depending on the level of NGE (zero, 
20% and 30%) and in columns (2) and (4) a value of 1 to 6 (zero, 10%, 15%, 20%, 30% and 35%). See Table A3 
for variable definitions. “Restricted variables” drops (co-linear) structural unemployment in column (3) and 
claimant unemployment in column (4). 
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Table 3: Area Level regressions – Instrumenting Maximum Investment 
Subsidies (NGE) with Rule change  
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Method OLS Reduced Form First Stage IV 
A. Dependent variable: ln(Unemployment) 
Maximum investment subsidy 
-0.169*** -0.318*** 
NGE 
(0.020) (0.064) 
Policy Rule Instrument 
-0.273*** 0.859*** 
(0.055) (0.031) 
B. Dependent variable: ln(Employment) 
Maximum investment subsidy 
0.169*** 0.831*** 
NGE 
(0.057) (0.202) 
Policy Rule Instrument 
0.713*** 0.859*** 
(0.174) (0.031) 
C. Dependent variable: ln(Number of Plants) 
Maximum investment subsidy 
0.014 0.215*** 
NGE 
(0.027) (0.083) 
Policy Rule Instrument 0.185*** 0.859*** 
(0.071) (0.031) 
Number of areas (wards) 10,737 10,737 10,737 10,737 
Observations 85,896 85,896 85,896 85,896 
Notes: *** denotes significance at the 1% level, **5% level and *10% level. NGE (“Net Grant Equivalent”) is 
the level of the maximum investment subsidy in the area. All columns include a full set of area fixed effects time 
dummies. Standard errors below coefficients are clustered by area (ward level) in all columns. The time period is 
1997-2004. Policy Rule instrument is described in text. All dependent variables in this and other tables are ln(1+Y) 
where Y is the raw value of the dependent variable. 
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Table 4:  
Area Level– Instrumenting amount of subsidy with Rule change 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Method OLS Reduced Form First Stage IV 
A. Dependent variable: ln(Unemployment) 
ln(RSA subsidy) 
-0.002** -0.062*** 
(0.001) (0.018) 
Policy Rule Instrument 
-0.273*** 4.418*** 
(0.055) (0.958) 
B. Dependent variable: ln(Employment) 
ln(RSA subsidy) 
0.011*** 0.161*** 
RSA 
(0.002) (0.051) 
Policy Rule Instrument 
0.713*** 4.418*** 
(0.174) (0.958) 
C. Dependent variable: ln(Number of Plants) 
ln(RSA subsidy) 
0.003*** 0.042** 
(0.001) (0.018) 
Policy Rule Instrument 0.185** 4.418*** 
(0.071) (0.958) 
Number of areas (wards) 10,737 10,737 10,737 10,737 
Observations 85,896 85,896 85,896 85,896 
Notes: *** denotes significance at the 1% level, **5% level and *10% level. Ln(subsidy), RSA, is the ln(1+total 
subsidies) in an area. All columns include a full set of area fixed effects time dummies. Standard errors below 
coefficients are clustered by area (ward level) in all columns. The time period is 1997-2004. Policy Rule 
instrument is described in text. These are the same specifications as in Table 3, but estimated at a higher level of 
aggregation (TTWA). 
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Table 5: Higher levels of aggregation - Travel to Work Area 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Method OLS Reduced Form First Stage IV 
A. Dependent variable: ln(Unemployment) 
ln(Max. investment subsidy) 
-0.301*** -1.082*** 
NGE 
(0.054) (0.373) 
Policy Rule Instrument 
-0.433*** 0.401*** 
(0.136) (0.125) 
B. Dependent variable: ln(Employment) 
ln(Max. investment subsidy) 
0.461*** 1.105*** 
NGE 
(0.089) (0.386) 
Policy Rule Instrument 
0.443*** 0.401*** 
(0.163) (0.125) 
C. Dependent variable: ln(Number of Plants) 
ln(Max. investment subsidy) 
0.061 0.236 
NGE 
(0.047) (0.181) 
Policy Rule Instrument 
0.095 0.401*** 
(0.072) (0.125) 
Number of areas (wards) 322 322 322 322 
Observations 2,576 2,576 2,576 2,576 
Notes: *** denotes significance at the 1% level, **5% level and *10% level. NGE (“Net Grant Equivalent”) is 
the level of the employment weighted average maximum investment subsidy rate in the area. All columns include 
a full set of area fixed effects and time dummies. Standard errors below coefficients are clustered by area (TTWA 
level) in all columns. The time period is 1997-2004. Policy Rule instrument is described in text. 
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Table 6: Plant Level regressions of ln(employment) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Method OLS 
Reduced 
Form First Stage IV 
A. Pooled across all plants, 792,091 observations on 139,796 plants 
ln(Maximum investment subsidy) 
0.021 0.416*** 
NGE 
(0.021) (0.073) 
Policy Rule Instrument 
0.282*** 0.676*** 
(0.049) (0.034) 
B. Small (Plants in Firm with under 50 employees), 720,151 observations on 126,508 
plants 
ln(Maximum investment subsidy) 
0.011 0.343*** 
NGE 
(0.023) (0.079) 
Policy Rule Instrument 
0.232*** 0.678*** 
(0.053) (0.035) 
C. Large Plants (Plants in Firms with over 50 employees), 71,940 observations on 13,288 
plants 
ln(Maximum investment subsidy) 
0.027 0.098 
NGE 
(0.044) (0.155) 
Policy Rule Instrument 
0.064 0.661*** 
(0.103) (0.043) 
Notes: *** denotes significance at the 1% level, **5% level and *10% level. NGE (“Net Grant Equivalent”) is 
the level of the maximum investment subsidy in the area.  All columns include a full set of area fixed effects time 
dummies. Standard errors below coefficients are clustered by area (ward level) in all columns. The time period is 
1997-2004. Policy Rule instrument is described in text. 
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Table 7: Is absence of policy effect on plants in large firms because they 
receive less subsidies?
(1) (2) (3) 
Method OLS First Stage IV 
Sample: Pooled across all plants, 792,091 observations on 139,796 plants 
A. Pooled, Dummy for subsidy receipt 
Receiving any subsidy? 0.006 1.034*** 
RSA>0 (0.009) (0.219) 
Policy Rule Instrument 0.272*** 
(0.035) 
B. Pooled, subsidy amount 
ln(subsidy) 0.002* 0.148*** 
RSA  (0.001) (0.037) 
Policy Rule Instrument 1.896*** 
(0.367) 
Sample: Small (Plants in Firm with under 50 employees), 720,151 obs on 126,508 plants 
C. Small, Dummy for subsidy receipt 
Receiving any subsidy? -0.016 0.982*** 
RSA>0 (0.011) (0.259) 
Policy Rule Instrument 0.237*** 
(0.033) 
D. Small, subsidy amount 
Ln(subsidy) 0.000 0.148*** 
RSA  (0.001) (0.046) 
Policy Rule Instrument 1.567*** 
(0.347) 
Sample: Large (Plants in Firm with over 50 employees), 71,940 obs on 13,288 plants 
E. Large, Dummy for subsidy receipt 
Receiving any subsidy? 0.035** 0.142 
RSA>0 (0.015) (0.226) 
Policy Rule Instrument 0.454*** 
(0.121) 
F. Large, subsidy amount 
ln(subsidy) 0.003** 0.018 
RSA  (0.001) (0.029) 
Policy Rule Instrument 3.548*** 
(1.374) 
Notes: *** denotes significance at the 1% level, **5% level and *10% level. Each cell is from a different 
regression and each of the eight panels is a different sample and measure of the treatment effect. All columns 
include a full set of area fixed effects time dummies. Standard errors below coefficients are clustered by area 
(ward level) in all columns. The time period is 1997-2004. Policy Rule instrument is described in text. “Receiving 
any subsidy” (RSA>0) is a dummy switched on when the firm begins receiving an investment subsidy and 
ln(subsidy), RSA, is the log of (1+the amount of subsidy received).  
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Table 8: Firm Level – Effects on jobs, investment, output and TFP. 
Instrumenting maximum investment subsidy with Rule change  
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Method OLS 
Reduced 
Form First Stage IV 
A. Dependent variable: ln(Employment), Full Sample (596,994 observations, 91,593 
firms) 
NGE 
0.049** 0.566*** 
(0.021) (0.069) 
Policy Rule Instrument 
0.392*** 0.693*** 
(0.048) (0.010) 
B. Dependent variable: ln(Employment), ARD sub-sample (45,545 observations, 21,404 
firms) 
NGE 
0.131*** 0.554*** 
(0.050) (0.151) 
Policy Rule Instrument 
0.412*** 0.744*** 
(0.112) (0.029) 
C. Dependent variable: ln(Capital Investment), ARD sub-sample (45,545 observations, 
21,404 firms) 
NGE 0.161 1.255* 
(0.261) (0.688) 
Policy Rule Instrument 0.934* 0.744*** 
(0.512) (0.029) 
D. Dependent variable: ln(Output), ARD sub-sample (45,545 observations, 21,404 
firms) 
NGE 0.051 0.450*** 
(0.055) (0.159) 
Policy Rule Instrument 0.335*** 0.744*** 
(0.117) (0.029) 
E. Dependent variable: ln(TFP), ARD sub-sample (45,545 observations, 21,404 firms) 
NGE -0.014 -0.072 
(0.029) (0.073) 
Policy Rule Instrument -0.054 0.744*** 
(0.055) (0.029) 
Notes: *** denotes significance at the 1% level, **5% level and *10% level. Policy Rule instrument is described 
in text. “Receiving any subsidy” is a dummy switched on when the firm begins receiving an investment subsidy. 
All columns include a full set of area fixed effects time dummies. Standard errors below coefficients are clustered 
by area (ward level) in all columns. The time period is 1997-2004. The Policy Rule instrument is described in 
text. TFP is computed using a “factor share” method and relative to an industry × year average (see Appendix C). 
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ONLINE APPENDICES: NOT INTENDED FOR PUBLICATION 
APPENDIX A: MORE DETAILS OF THE RSA POLICY 
During the period of our study, Regional Selective Assistance (RSA) was the main business support scheme 
in the UK.1 Since the early 1970s, RSA provided discretionary grants to firms in disadvantaged regions typically 
characterized by relatively low levels of per capita GDP and high unemployment (“Assisted Areas”).2 It was 
designed to “create and safeguard employment”. Assistance could be provided to establish a new business, to 
expand, modernize or rationalize an existing business, to set up research and development facilities or to move 
from development to production. 
Because RSA had the potential to distort competition and trade between European countries, it had to comply 
with European Union (EU) legislation concerning state aid. In general, European law except in certain cases 
prohibits this type of assistance. In particular, Article 87 of the Treaty of Amsterdam allows for state aid in support 
of the EU’s regional development objectives. The guidelines designate very deprived “Tier 1 Areas” (formerly, 
“Development Areas”) in which higher rates of grant can be offered and somewhat less deprived “Tier 2 Areas” 
(formerly, “Intermediate Areas”) where lower rates of investment subsidy were offered.3 There is an upper 
threshold of support called the Net Grant Equivalent (NGE)4 that essentially sets a maximum proportion of the 
firm’s investment that can be subsidized by the government.  
Since the main formulae that determine eligibility are decided periodically at the European level, and not at 
the Member State level, this mitigates concerns of endogeneity of policy decisions to a local area. In addition, 
although the UK government has latitude to decide the overall amount of the annual budget for RSA, it must stick 
to the EU rules when deciding which areas are eligible to receive RSA. Thus, changes to area-level eligibility are 
the key form of identification in our paper. 
Changes in eligibility over time 
The map of the areas eligible for RSA changes about once every seven years.5 The maps were changed in 
1984, 1993, 2000 and 2006. In the paper, we focus on the 2000 change because we could not (despite extensive 
investigation) discover the exact variables used in determining area eligibility in 1984 and previous years. Without 
this, we could not construct the rules change IV for the 1993 change, although we do show OLS results over the 
longer 1984-2004 period for employment. There were changes in the way that the administrative data were 
gathered after 2004, so we have to end our sample period in 2004 and cannot easily use the 2006 change. We 
begin the analysis in 1997, as unemployment data is unavailable on a consistent basis at the ward level before this 
year. 
The map of the eligible areas is determined by using a series of quantitative indicators. The level of GDP 
per capita, unemployment and population density are key indicators that have been used in all years. A series of 
additional indicators is also used and the EU determines what these are and what years are used for their values – 
these are detailed in Table A3. The eligibility criteria are outlined in guidelines that are published before the 
1 We discuss our choice of study period below. According to Harris and Robinson (2005), in 1998/9 RSA 
represented 19% of the UK’s industrial policy spending.  
2 In April 2004, in England, the RSA scheme was rebranded as the Selective Finance for Investment scheme and 
then Grant for Business Investment. It is still called RSA in Scotland and Wales. Productivity became an official 
objective with the move from RSA to Selective Finance for Investment and remains an objective of Grant for 
Business Investment. 
3 Article 87 of the Treaty of Amsterdam supersedes Article 93 of the Treaty of Rome which had previously 
governed State Aid. Article 87(3) of the Treaty of Amsterdam defines conditions where State aid may be 
compatible with EU laws. Article 87(3) (a) allows for “aid to promote the economic development of areas where 
the standard of living is abnormally low or where there is serious underemployment” [Tier 1 or Development 
Areas] and Article 87(3) (c) allows for: “aid to facilitate the development of economic activities or of certain 
economic areas, where such aid does not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common 
interest.” [Tier 2 or intermediate Areas] Additional restrictions apply to sectors with over-capacity: motor 
vehicles, synthetic fibres and yarns, iron and steel, coal, fishery and agricultural products. 
4 The Net Grant Equivalent (NGE) of aid is the benefit accruing to the recipient from the grant after payment of 
taxes on company profits. RSA grants must be entered in the accounts as income and are made subject to tax. 
Details for calculations of NGEs are available in the Commission’s Official Journal C74/19 10.03.1998. 
5 Note that this happens in conjunction with the periodic revision of the Structural Funds, the EU’s main policy 
for supporting economic development in less prosperous regions. Although the maps are different for RSA and 
Structural Funds, it is a potentially confounding influence we that we check as discussed in the main text (sub-
section VB) 
2 
implementation of the map (in our case 1998). The UK government will then gather quantitative information on 
indicators at the relevant area level and will propose a new map that has to be approved by the EU. The changes 
before and after 2000 is shown in Figure 1 and Criscuolo et al (2006) discuss 2-4 shows the map changes at other 
points in time . 
(a) The 1993 change 
The assisted area map for RSA was re-drawn in 1993 based on the 1988 guidelines using “Travel to Work 
Areas” as the underlying spatial units.6 The Assisted Areas fell into two categories: (a) Development Areas where 
aid could be granted up to a maximum of 30% NGE (Net Grant Equivalent - see above) and (b) Intermediate 
Areas where aid was limited to 20% NGE. The new 1993 maps implied a net reduction in the number of assisted 
areas with Development Areas covering 17%, and Intermediate Areas covering 19%, of the total UK population. 
(b) The change in 2000 
The EU Commission introduced new guidelines for State Aid in 1998, and the UK responded to that with 
the introduction of a new Assisted Area map in 2000. The number of indicators fell from eight in 1993 to six in 
2000. The most disadvantaged areas were re-named “Tier 1” - Cornwall and the Isles of Scilly, Merseyside, South 
Yorkshire and West Wales and the Valleys. The maximum investment subsidy allowed in these areas was 35% 
NGE. “Tier 2” areas were more scattered are were constructed based on groups of electoral wards.7 Within Tier 
2 areas, the map identified four sub-tier areas eligible for different level of maximum NGE. The level of aid 
intensities proposed for these areas varied according to the seriousness and intensity of the problems in each 
region, relative to other EU countries. For the most disadvantaged Tier 2 areas, that were geographically distant 
and sparsely populated, a maximum subsidy rate of 30% NGE was allowed.8 The maximum NGE level for 
relatively less deprived areas was 10%. However, if those (less deprived) areas adjoined a Tier 1 area they had a 
20% ceiling. The rest of the eligible areas aid ceilings were either an NGE of 20% or 15% (with the decision as 
to which applies made by referring to current conditions as well as the NGE in the 1993 map).  
Formal criteria for receipt of RSA 
During our study period (1997-2004), RSA targeted manufacturing sectors. The grants were discretionary 
and firms could only apply if the supported project satisfied the following criteria. (a) Location: The project had 
to be undertaken in an Assisted Area. (b) Investment: It had to involve capital expenditure on property, plant or 
machinery; (c) Jobs: It should normally have been expected to lead to the creation of new employment or directly 
protect jobs of existing workers which would otherwise have been lost; (d) Viability: The project should be viable 
and should help the business become more competitive; (e) Need: The applicant had to demonstrate that assistance 
was necessary for the project to proceed as envisaged in terms of nature, scale, timing or location;9 (f) Prior 
Commitments: As RSA could only be offered when the project could not proceed without it, BIS must have 
completed its appraisal and issued a formal offer of assistance before the applicant entered into any commitment 
to proceed with the project; (g) Other Funding: The greater part of the funding for the project should be met by 
the applicant or other sources in the private sector. Note that location, which forms the basis for our instrumental 
variables, is objective, clearly defined and enforceable. 
The process for application was as follows. Firms completed an application form, in which they needed to 
prove additionality, to provide business plans, accounts and reasons for wanting the grant. They then submitted 
this to the local office of the Department of Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS). During the period analyzed, 
the lag between submission and decision was normally between 35 and 60 days form standard grants, and 100 
days or more for grants above £2 million. The lag depended on the amount applied for, the time needed to ensure 
that all of the criteria were met and on negotiations between the government agency and the firm. If the application 
was successful, the firm was paid the minimum necessary to get the project going. Additional payments started 
only after jobs were created/safeguarded and capital expenditure defrayed and were based on agreed targets. The 
payments were given in instalments – between two and seven and usually spread across more than one financial 
6 Travel to Work Areas (TTWA) are defined by the UK Census Bureau (Office for National Statistics). The 
fundamental criterion is that, of the resident economically active population, at least 75% actually work in the 
area, and that of everyone working in the area; at least 75% actually live in the area. 
7 The data used for the boundaries come from the 1991 Census of Population. A detailed list of the assisted wards 
by local authority within regions and the NGEs to which they are eligible is available upon request.  
8 These areas have a population density of less than 12.5 inhabitants per square kilometre and are mainly the 
Highlands of Scotland (1.2% of assisted area’s population were in these areas). 
9 This may be to meet a funding gap, to reduce the risks associated with the project, or to influence the choice of 
location of a mobile project. It might also be to obtain parent company approval by meeting established investment 
criteria; or for some other acceptable reason. Each case is considered on its own merits. 
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year. The government agency monitored the project with visits (normally one per year, but more frequently for 
risky projects). 
APPENDIX B: THE ROLE OF CHANGES IN THE CRITERIA IN 
DETERMINING ELIGIBILITY FOR RSA 
As noted in the main text, to deal with the issue that areas may be endogenously selected into being eligible 
for investment subsidies we use an instrument based on the probability that an area is assigned, based solely on 
the EU wide rule changes rather than changing area characteristics.  
There are two practical issues in implementing this IV. First, although the EU reveals what is in the X vector 
determining eligibility for different subsidy levels, it does not reveal the exact policy parameters that determine 
eligibility.  
A second issue is that the maximum subsidy differs in the eligible areas according to the severity of 
disadvantage. For example, after 2000 an area could fall into several categories with a maximum support share of 
10%, 15%, 20%, 30% or 35% percent. Before 2000, there were two maximum support categories: 20% and 30%. 
We proceed by defining a latent variable 𝑠𝑟,𝑡
∗   for area 𝑟 and the two time periods τ which captures how the
European Commission determines how disadvantaged is an area. The threshold cut-offs will determine which of 
the different maximum support level categories (NGEs) an area is to be placed in. In 2000 and after there are six 
bins (including zero) and before 2000, there were three bins. For simplicity, we keep to the same notation as in 
the main text in sub-section III.A, even though for simplicity there we discussed in terms of a binary outcome for 
expositional purposes, whereas now we are using the fact we have multiple categories. 
To construct instruments that are only driven by changes in the rules rather than changes in area conditions 
during we run two ordered probit regressions for the post and pre 2000 periods. Our vector of area characteristics 
𝑋𝑟,93 includes all variables that were used by the EU for deciding about support status in the pre-2000 and post-
2000 periods. Recall, however, we only estimate using values of the X variables dated prior to 1993 as used in 
1993 rule change (in fact, given the lag structure used by the EU, the most recently dated value is 1988). This is 
because using values dated after 1993 could potentially be endogenous (recall equation (5) in the main text). This 
makes the estimates of the policy rule less precise, but so long as there is still some power of the first stage then 
the instruments will be valid. Formally, the model is: 
*
, ,93 ,r r r
s X       where  τ = {93,00} 
*
,93 93 ,93 ,93r r r
s X     
*
,00 00 ,93 ,00r r r
s X    
Where *
,r
s   are the latent variables of “disadvantage” in area r at time τ; and there are threshold parameters, 
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are the “weights” and the “thresholds”. 
We report results from the estimation of the ordered probits in Table 2. The signs generally look broadly 
sensible (with the caveat that these are not marginal effects). Areas with higher lower per person, lower labor 
force participation rates, lower population densities and greater increases in long-duration unemployment are 
more likely to be high subsidy areas. 
From these ordered probit estimates we obtain the predicted probabilities (
, ,
ˆ
j r
P   ) of falling into each bin in 
each year for each area given their observables (
,93r
X ) and the estimated parameters ( ˆ ). The final stage is to
create the predicted level of subsidy that we will use as an IV: 
 4 
𝑧𝑟,  =
{
 
 
 
 
,00 , ,00
ˆ
j j r
j
c P  𝑖𝑓 𝜏 =  2000
,93 , ,93
ˆ
j j r
j
c P   𝑖𝑓 𝜏 = 1993
𝑧𝑟,  =
{
 
 
 
 
,00 , ,00
ˆ
j j r
j
c P  𝑖𝑓 𝜏 =  2000
,93 , ,93
ˆ
j j r
j
c P   𝑖𝑓 𝜏 = 1993
 
 
This specification has the advantage that we can interpret reduced form coefficients in a similar way as 
regressions of the actual support status (NGE). The distribution of the levels and changes of the IV are in Figures 
A1 and A2. 
 We experimented with many other ways of constructing the instruments to make sure that nothing hinges 
on modelling details and our results are robust. For example, in Table A12 we report our main results using 
instruments constructed from predictions of Linear Probability Model of the NGE values rather than the ordered 
probit of NGE categories. We also estimated models using ordered logit as well as simple logit and probit 
specifications on the binary event of a non-zero NGE value in an area.  
 
APPENDIX C: MORE DETAILS ON DATA, MATCHING TO RSA AND 
PRODUCTIVITY ESTIMATION 
The Datasets  
We use administrative data on RSA program participants (SAMIS) with data from the Interdepartmental 
Business Register (IDBR), which contains both the names of the businesses and the identification numbers used 
by the Office for National Statistics (ONS), the UK Census Bureau to conduct the Annual Business Inquiry 
(ABI).10 The IDBR is a list of all businesses in the UK, their addresses, type of activity and ownership structure. 
The list is compiled using a combination of tax records, accounting information (every UK firm has to lodge some 
information at Companies House). The smallest unit in the IDBR is a site that contains name, address and 
information on the number of employees and industry. We also know the enterprise (firm) that owns the site and 
whether this is part of a larger group (“enterprise group). Investigation showed that some of the most micro-units 
(the sites identifiers) are not reliable over time; we grouped all sites of a firm in a Ward into a single “local unit” 
which we refer to as a “plant” in the text. 
A stratified random sample of enterprises is drawn every year from the IDBR to form the sampling frame 
for the ABI (Annual Business Inquiry), the mandatory annual survey of UK businesses. Data from the ABI is 
made available to researchers in the form of the ARD (Annual Respondents Database), which provides 
information on output, investment, intermediate inputs, employment, wages, etc.11 The ARD is similar to the US 
Annual Survey of Manufacturing (ASM) with the caveat it covers all sectors (not just manufacturing) and is at a 
higher level of aggregation than the plant-level ASM. Not only is the ARD a sub-sample of the population IBRD, 
but the information is reported at a more aggregated level across the entire firm (“reporting unit”), rather than at 
the plant (“local unit”). For example, a firm with two 10 worker plants in two different wards will have only total 
employment reported in the ARD (20 workers), whereas the IDBR will identify both local units. Note that in 
about 80% of all cases a firm is single plant and located entirely at a single address.  
The upshot is that whereas employment can be matched exactly to an area, so we can analyze at whatever 
level we like (e.g. plant, firm or ward); the analysis of investment and productivity for the population can only be 
accurately conducted at the firm level, and not a lower level. Note that the ARD contains the population of larger 
businesses (those over 100 or 250 employees depending on the exact year) and accounts for around 90% of total 
UK manufacturing employment. 
 
Matching Datasets 
Since the performance data comes from sources unrelated to program participation, several problems arise 
in matching.  The Department of Business uses name and postcodes from its administrative SAMIS data to match 
a list of participants and applicants to the population IDBR.  This matching may occur at the plant-level or the 
firm level. Often a firm will apply for funding; so that we cannot know for sure whether a particular plant has 
benefited from RSA receipt (although for the 80% of single-firm plants there is never an ambiguity). Thus, our 
primary measure of program participation is whether a plant was in a firm that received any RSA (which we can 
                                                 
10 The IDBR was introduced between 1994 and 1995. Previously, that sampling was based on a Business 
Register maintained by the Office of National Statistics. 
11 Stratification is broadly based on industry affiliation, regional location and size. For details, see Criscuolo et 
al. (2003). 
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always define precisely). For a small number of cases, the same SAMIS identifier could match to multiple IDBR 
firms. In these cases we aggregated the IDBR firms together, but we checked the results were robust to dropping 
these few cases (they were). The ARD is a strict sub-set of the IDBR, so the issues discussed above apply in the 
same way to this dataset. 
The SAMIS database has information on 54,322 program applications and whether or not the application 
was successful. Applicant numbers declined in the 2000s as the total budget for RSA fell. Using name, postcode 
and CRN numbers, the information in BIS files was linked to the IDBR over the whole period. The matching rate 
was 82% over the sample period (1997-2004).  
There is a variety of reasons for non-matches. The most common reason is that the information on the SAMIS 
database of RSA participants is inadequately detailed to form a reliable match to the IDBR. It is also possible that 
the IDBR misses some of the smaller and shorter-lived firms who receive RSA. To check biases arising from 
matching we conducted a detailed comparison of the characteristics of projects and project participants of firms 
that BIS matched with IDBR relative to all the projects in the SAMIS database. The analysis shows that the set of 
“IDBR matches” do not significantly differ from the rest of the projects in the database on observed characteristics, 
and this is the case for both unsuccessful and successful applications. The variables we considered in the 
regression were application amounts; headquarter location, a dichotomous variable that is one if the application 
was handled by the London office of BIS, foreign owned, and a BIS code that seeks to identify “internationally 
mobile” jobs. More details are available from the authors and in Criscuolo et al (2006). 
Firm Size Definition 
In some of the analysis, we split by firm size (e.g. Table 7). To mitigate endogeneity concerns we use 
firm size as measured by employment in a base period, for which we choose 1996, the year before our estimation 
period. For all plants belonging to a firm who were not alive in 1996 we use the year of birth to determine the size 
class and exclude data from the first year in our regressions of employment. We also experimented with dropping 
post 1996 entrants, which led to very similar results.  
 
TFP (Total Factor Productivity) measures 
There are numerous ways to obtain a TFP measure, a subject of ongoing debate in the literature (see inter alia 
Olley and Pakes, 1996 and Ackerberg et al, 2007). The results in Panel E of Table 8 are based on a simple “factor 
share” method and relative to an industry by year average. We define 𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝜏𝑖𝑡 − 𝜏?̅?(𝑖)𝑡 where  𝜏𝑖𝑡 = 𝑟𝑖𝑡 −
𝑆?̅?𝐼(𝑖)𝑡𝑚𝑖𝑡 − 𝑆?̅?𝐼(𝑖)𝑡𝑙𝑖𝑡 − (1 − 𝑆?̅?𝐼(𝑖)𝑡 − 𝑆?̅?𝐼(𝑖)𝑡)𝑘𝑖𝑡  . In this expression 𝑟𝑖𝑡   is ln(firm revenue) for firm 𝑖 in period 
𝑡, 𝑚𝑖𝑡 is ln(materials), 𝑙𝑖𝑡 is ln(employment) and 𝑘𝑖𝑡 is ln(capital). 𝑆?̅?𝐼(𝑖)𝑡 is the share of materials in revenue in 
the four-digit industry and 𝑆?̅?𝐼(𝑖)𝑡 is the share of labor costs in revenue at the industry level. 𝜏?̅?(𝑖)𝑡 is the average 
value for 𝜏𝑖𝑡 in year 𝑡 in the four digit industry. 
We also considered alternative ways of computing TFP (see Table A11). Firstly, we consider a 
“regression-based” method where we use ln(revenue) as the dependent variables and include on the right hand 
side in addition to treatment controls ln(labor), ln(materials) and ln(capital). Secondly, we consider a more 
structural production function estimation approach as proposed in Martin (2012) which takes into account firm 
specific variation in market power when computing TFP. This requires running the following (first stage) 
regression: Ξ𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝜌(Ξ𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑡−1 ) + 𝜈𝑖𝑡 where Ξ𝑖𝑡 =
𝑟𝑖𝑡−𝑆𝑀𝑖𝑡(𝑚𝑖𝑡−𝑘𝑖𝑡) −𝑆𝐿𝑖𝑡(𝑙𝑖𝑡−𝑘𝑖𝑡)
𝑆𝑀𝑖𝑡
 and 𝑆𝑀𝑖𝑡 , 𝑆𝐿𝑖𝑡  are 
the variables factor shares at the firm level. From this we can estimate a productivity index as 𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑀𝑈𝑂𝑀𝐸𝐺𝐴 =
Ξ𝑖𝑡−?̂?𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑡
?̂?𝑘
. 
 
APPENDIX D: AGGREGATING ACROSS SPATIAL UNITS  
We consider the aggregation from lower (wards) to higher levels area (Travel to Work Areas) as discussed 
in sub-section VC. For simplicity consider the set-up of a single Travel to Work Area (TTWA, denoted a) 
consisting of two wards r1 and r2 and assume that we are dealing only with two periods t = 0 and t = 1. It is 
straightforward to generalize this to multiple wards, TTWAs and time periods (we do this in the empirical 
application). Suppose we know that as a consequence of the program in period 1, ward r1 experiences a change 
of employment of 1r  log points whereas ward r2 experiences a change of 2r  log points; i.e. 
1,1 1,0 1
lnln
r r r
L L   . And similarly for ward r2. 
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We are interested in what will be the effect of the policy on total employment at the higher TTWA level. We 
can write TTWA employment as the sum of the two wards: , 1, 2,a t r t r tL L L  . Hence the logarithmic change in 
employment is: 
 1 2,1 ,0 1,0 1,0ln lnl 1n r ra a r rL sL e se
                                    (D1) 
where 
1,0
1,0
1,0 2,0
r
r
r r
L
L L
s

  is the share of employment in Ward 1 in period 0. Re-write equation (D1) as:  
      1 2 1 2 1 21,0 1,0 2 1,0 1 2 1,0ln 1 ln 1 1 1r r r r r rr r r r r re e e es s s s
                   
 
  
Where 1 is an approximation error that is small for values of  1 2 1,01r r re s
 
  close to zero. 
Similarly note that    1 2 1 22 2 1 21 ln 1 1r r r r r re e
              


  for  
1 2 1r re
 
  close to 
zero and where 
2
  is another approximation error.12 
Consequently, we can write the change in TTWA employment as: 
   ,1 ,0 2 1 2 1,0 1,0 1 1,0 2lnl 1n a a r r r r r r r rL s s sL          
               
(D2) 
In other words, the percentage TTWA level change is approximately the percentage change in each ward 
weighed with the employment share of each ward.  
This allows us to examine the case of negative spillovers as well. Suppose the policy leads to a positive 
effect of   in region 1 at the expense of a negative spillover of  in region 2. For the aggregate TTWA we would 
consequently expect the effect on employment to be: 
 1,0 1,01r rs s   
Also note that if we assume that the treatment effect of different levels of NGE can be modeled linearly as: 
rr
NGE   
then equation (D2) implies that  running a TTWA level regression with ward-level employment weighted average 
NGE as treatment variable should lead to comparable magnitudes of estimates of the TTWA level impact a =
a a
NGE
 
where a r r
r
NN E s GEG  . Considering that the approximation error leads to an underestimate 
we certainly can rule out negative spillover effects if we find that the TTWA level effects are equal or larger than 
the ward level effects. In the empirical estimates at the TTWA level in Table 5 we do indeed see that the treatment 
effects looks larger than at the ward level in Table 3. 
  
                                                 
12 Note that the two errors go in opposite directions with the first one overestimating and the second one 
underestimating the true figure. The second error is also likely larger so that on net we are underestimating the 
true figure. Simulations of the errors suggest that these are under 5%. 
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Table A1: Changes in eligibility for RSA at times of EU rules changes 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Unit of 
Observation 
Year 
Total Number of 
Units  
Units which 
changed their 
RSA eligibility 
Increase in 
eligibility for 
subsidies 
Decrease in 
eligibility for 
subsidies 
Areas (wards) 
2000 10,737 4,048 1,424 2,624 
1993 10,737 1,893 1,034 859 
Plants 
2000 163,796 50,920 14,967 35,953 
1993 146,420 23,225 14,369 8,856 
Notes: The first two rows relate to areas (wards) and the second two rows to plants. Column (2) indicates how 
many areas changed their eligibility status and this is divided into increases (column (3)) and decreases (column 
(4)). The eligibility maps changed in 1993 and 2000. The changes could be from zero or across different rates of 
support. In the paper we use only the 2000 change for the IV because we do not know all the criteria for the rules 
governing the changes before and after 1993. 
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Table A2: Descriptive statistics across areas (Wards), Manufacturing 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  
Aggregate 
expenditure 
on RSA 
(£m) 
Average 
NGE 
(maximum 
investment 
subsidy)  
rate in 
eligible 
wards 
Eligible 
Wards 
(as % of 
all 
Wards) 
Jobs in 
eligible 
areas 
(millions) 
Plants in 
Eligible 
Areas 
Jobs in 
eligible 
areas (as 
% of all 
jobs) 
% plants 
in eligible 
areas 
% plants 
in eligible 
areas 
receiving 
support 
1997 158.27 0.241 31.9 1.230 44,755 42.1 32.4            4.4 
1998 115.32 0.241 31.9 1.211 43,575 41.9 32.3 3.1 
1999 91.76 0.241 31.9 1.168 43,101 41.7 32.3 2.8 
2000 185.68 0.237 26.1 1.041 36,557 38.6  28.0 3.4 
2001 219.69 0.237 26.1 1.002 35,837 37.9 28.0 3.1 
2002 192.71 0.237 26.1 0.939 35,274 37.6 28.0 3.0 
2003 197.26 0.237 26.1 0.900 34,797 37.7 28.1 3.1 
2004 148.58 0.237 26.1 0.866 34,437 37.9 28.0 3.0 
Average 163.66 0.238 28.3 1.045 38,542 39.4 29.6 3.1 
 
Notes: Column (1) is total expenditure on RSA. Column (2) is the average NGE across the eligible wards. Column 
(3) is the share of wards that are eligible for RSA. Column (4) are the number of jobs in eligible areas. Column 
(5) is the number of plants in eligible areas. Column (6) reports the jobs in eligible areas as a fraction of all jobs. 
Column (7) reports the plants in eligible areas as a fraction of all plants. Column (9) is the fraction of plants in 
eligible areas that receive support. All data refer to manufacturing sector. 
 
Source: Industrial Development Reports (various years) and authors’ calculation using the IDBR, ARD and 
SAMIS matched data. 
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Table A3 - Variables that define Rules for eligibility
Variable Definition Timing of data used by 
EU for eligibility Source 
Used in which 
years for rules 
Mean 
(std. dev) 
GDP per capita 
Value added in the area per person 1991 (for 1993); 1994-
96 average (for 2000) Eurostat 
1993 and 
2000 
91.7 (15.9) 
94.1 (28.8) 
Population Density 
Number of inhabitants per square km 1981 (for 1993) 
1991 Census 
1993 and 2000 10.4 
(16.5) 
Share of high Skilled workers 
Share of working residents aged over 16 in high 
skilled occupation (SOC Groups 1 to 3)  1991 Census 
1993 34 
(12) 
Start-Up rate 
Annualized net percentage rate of growth company 
VAT registrations (except retail and agriculture); 
i.e. total registrations minus de-registrations 1987-1991 
ONS Business 
Register 
1993 2.3 
(7.5) 
Structural  Unemployment rate 
Average annual unemployment (based on ILO 
definition) rate over 5 years 1986-90 ONS 
1993 3.5 
(1.7) 
Activity rate 
Fraction of working age population who are 
economically active relative (men: 16-64; women: 
16-59) 
1991 Census 1993 
61 
(6.3) 
Employment Rate 
Residents in employment divided by population of 
working age 1992 
Labor Force 
Survey 
2000 73 
(6.5) 
Current Unemployment rate 
(Claimant Count) 
Average monthly unemployment rate over year 
(residents claiming unemployment insurance 
divided by labor force) 
1991 (for 1993); 1998 
(for 2000) ONS 
1993 and 2000 3.9 
(1.4) 
ILO Unemployment Rate 
Proportion of residential labor force who are “ILO” 
unemployed ,  1992 
Labour Force 
Survey 
2000 9.04 
(3.6) 
Long-duration Unemployment rate 
Number claiming unemployed insurance for more 
than a year as a fraction of the labour force 1991 Census 
1993 0.9 
 (1.4) 
Share of manufacturing workers 
Number of manufacturing employee jobs divided 
by total jobs 1991 Census 
2000 16.9 (8.2) 
Notes: These are the definitions of variables used by the EU to determine whether an area is eligible for RSA and if so, at what level of support. ILO unemployed are defined 
as individuals who are (i) without a job, want a job, have actively sought work in the last four weeks and are available to start work in the next two weeks, or (ii) are out of 
work, have found a job and are waiting to start it in the next two weeks. People who are not claimants can appear among ILO unemployed if they are not entitled to 
unemployment related benefits. Similarly, unemployment claimants may not appear in the LFS measure of unemployment if they state that they are not seeking, or are not 
available to start work. 
Source: Official Journal of the European Communities (1998), OJ C 74, 10.3; and OJ C 88/C 212/02, 12.8.1988; Department of Trade and Industry (1999) “The UK 
Government’s proposals for new Objective 2 areas” Official letter SG(2000) D/ 106293; Department of Trade and Industry (1993), “Review of the assisted areas of Great 
Britain. Background document on the new assisted areas map”  
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Table A4: Ward level - Bootstrapped standard errors to account for generated instruments  
 
 Dep. Variable: Unemployment Employment Plants 
Rule Change Instrument -0.273*** 0.713*** 0.185*** 
 (0.077) (0.178) (0.069) 
Observations 85,896 85,896 85,896 
Wards 10,737 10,737 10,737 
 
Notes: The standard errors in most of our tables ignore the fact that our rule change instrument emerges after regressing support status on various area level statistics taken into 
account by EU rules; i.e. as reported in Table 2. Here we provide bootstrapped results (clustered at the ward level) of the whole procedure for the reduced form estimates only. 
This shows that standard errors very similar to those simpler ones found in (column 2) of Table 2. 
 
 
 
Table A5: Area Level regressions – Placebo regressions 1995-1999 of ln(Employment) 
 
 
Baseline:2000 Placebo: 
1997 
Years 1997-2004 1995-1999 
Policy Rule Instrument 
0.713*** 0.125 
  
(0.174) (0.123) 
Observations 85,896 42,948 
Wards 10,737 10,737 
 
Notes: The policy rule instrument is constructed as if the policy change happened in 1997 in columns (2). Column (1) is baseline in 2000 when actual change took place 
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Table A6: Robustness of Ward Level regressions – Long time horizon (1986-2004) and Common Support 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent Variable: ln(Employment) ln(# Plants) 
Ln(unemp 
loyment) 
Ln(unemp 
loyment) 
Ln(unemp 
loyment) 
Ln(Emp 
loyment) 
Ln(Emp 
loyment) 
Ln(Emp 
loyment) 
Trimming:   1% 5% 10% 1% 5% 10% 
NGE 0.280*** 0.079***       
 (0.071) (0.029)       
Rules Change IV   -0.403*** -0.363*** -0.396*** 0.809*** 0.773*** 0.844*** 
   (0.045) (0.047) (0.051) (0.145) (0.163) (0.182) 
         
Time period 1986-2004 1986-2004 1997-2004 1997-2004 1997-2004 1997-2004 1997-2004 1997-2004 
Observations 204,003 204,003 82,576 70,040 55,880 82,576 70,040 55,880 
#areas 10,737 10,737 10,322 8,755 6,985 10,322 8,755 6,985 
 
Notes: *** denotes significance at the 1% level, **5% level and *10% level. Each cell is from a different regression and each of the eight panels is a different sample and 
measure of the treatment effect. All columns include a full set of area fixed effects and time dummies. Standard errors below coefficients are clustered by area (ward level) in 
all columns. The time period is 1986-2004 in columns (1) and (2) and 1997-2004 in the other columns. Policy Rule instrument is described in text. NGE is maximum investment 
grant subsidy. Columns (1) and (2) extend the sample back to 1986. Columns (3)-(8) trim the sample to get a closer common support; “1%” trims the sample at the lowest and 
top percentiles, “2%” trims from 2nd to 98th percentile, etc. 
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Table A7: Test of Rule change instrument (Reduced Forms) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable: 
 
Ln(Unemployment)t - 
Ln(Unemployment)1997 
Ln(Employment)t - 
Ln(Employment)1997 
Ln(# Plants)t - Ln(# Plants)1997 
 
Rule Change IV  -0.650*** -0.569*** 1.035*** 0.924*** 0.259*** 0.226*** 
 (0.054) (0.057) (0.174) (0.185) (0.073) (0.077) 
GDP per person relative to EU Average   0.002***  -0.001***  -0.001*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Population density   0.013  -0.026  -0.031 
  (0.023)  (0.057)  (0.026) 
Share of high skilled   0.084***  0.047  0.015 
  (0.021)  (0.051)  (0.023) 
Start-up rate   0.267***  -0.301***  -0.124*** 
  (0.040)  (0.083)  (0.042) 
Structural  unemployment rate   2.036***  0.34  0.08 
  (0.351)  (0.815)  (0.345) 
Activity rate   0.215***  -0.097  -0.061 
  (0.037)  (0.088)  (0.041) 
Employment rate   -0.412***  0.136  0.150** 
  (0.072)  (0.170)  (0.072) 
Current unemployment rate (claimants) 
 
 -3.663***  -1.779  -0.369 
 (0.481)  (1.106)  (0.503) 
Unemployment  rate (ILO) 
 
 0.006  -0.024  0.04 
 (0.130)  (0.305)  (0.132) 
Long-duration unemployment rate   0.546***  -0.566  -0.647*** 
  (0.165)  (0.493)  (0.195) 
Share of manufacturing workers   0.568***  -0.421***  -0.127*** 
  (0.031)  (0.074)  (0.032) 
 
Notes: *** denotes significance at the 1% level, **5% level and *10% level. These are reduced form estimates of the effects of the rule change. The dependent variables are 
in changes from their 1997 levels. The rule change instrument is the value of the IV after 2000 minus its pre-2000 level. The levels of the right hand variables are from Table 
A3. All columns include a full set of time dummies. Standard errors below coefficients are clustered by area (ward level). The time period is 1997-2004. There are 74,613 
observations and 10,731 areas in all columns. 
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Table A8: RSA Impact in large vs small firms 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Average Subsidy 
amount (£100s) 
Average number of 
employees 
Elasticity between 
employment and 
subsidies 
Marginal Impact of 
subsidy 
Small Firm (under 50) 29.45 18 0.148 0.090 
Large Firm (over 50) 107.19 211 0.018 0.035 
Notes: The Table calculates the marginal effect of a £1,000 of subsidy on the number of jobs, split by large and small firms. Column (1) is the average subsidy received and 
column (2) is the average plant size from our data 1997-99. In column (3) we report the elasticity between jobs and subsidies received (   ) estimated in column (3) of Table 7 
for small firms (Panel D) and large firms (panel F). Since 
lnL
ln





 where L = employment and  = subsidy, the marginal effect of a $ of subsidy on the number of jobs is: 
L L

 



. This is given in column (4). It shows that the marginal impact of subsidies on jobs is over twice as large in plants belonging to small firms than large firms. 
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Table A9: Alternative Size cut-offs, Plants 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
OLS Reduced Form First Stage IV 
Panel A. Small Firm employment less than 40 in 1996 (707,745 observations; 124,467 
firms; 10,279 area clusters) 
Subsidy amount 0.000 0.153*** 
(0.001) (0.050) 
Policy Rule 0.223*** 1.462*** 
instrument (0.054) (0.347) 
Panel B. Large Firm employment greater than 40 in 1996 (84,346 observations; 
15,329 firms; 4,677 area clusters) 
Subsidy amount 0.002* 0.031 
(0.001) (0.026) 
Policy Rule 0.123 3.925*** 
instrument (0.095) (1.270) 
Panel C. Small Firm employment less than 60 in 1996 (728,839 observations; 127,965 
firms  10,288  area clusters) 
Subsidy Amount 0.000 0.141*** 
(0.001) (0.043) 
Policy Rule 0.232*** 1.646*** 
instrument (0.052) (0.349) 
Panel D. Large Firm employment greater than 60 in 1996 (63,252 observations;11,831 
firms; 4,166 area clusters) 
Subsidy Amount 0.003** 0.032 
(0.001) (0.036) 
Policy Rule 0.105 3.227** 
instrument (0.110) (1.506) 
Notes: *** denotes significance at the 1% level, **5% level and *10% level. These are all plant-level regressions 
splitting the samples by firm size in 1996 (or the year the plant enters the sample). Each cell is from a different 
regression. All columns include a full set of area fixed effects time dummies. Standard errors below coefficients 
are clustered by area (ward level) in all columns. The time period is 1997-2004. Policy Rule instrument is 
described in text. 
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Table A10: Do small firms respond to treatment more because they are younger? 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent variable: ln(employment)      
Definition of young is alive for no more 
than:  
One 
year Two years 
Three 
years 
Four 
years 
Subsidy Amount 0.009 0.016 0.022 0.023 0.029 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
Subsidy Amount × 0.118*** 0.125*** 0.136*** 0.148*** 0.163*** 
Small Firm (0.046) (0.047) (0.049) (0.051) (0.054) 
Subsidy Amount ×  -0.102*** -0.081*** -0.076*** -0.085*** 
Young firms  (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) 
      
Observations 618,098 618,098 618,098 618,098 618,098 
Firms 95,404 95,404 95,404 95,404 95,404 
Area Clusters 9,943 9,943 9,943 9,943 9,943 
      
 
Notes: These are specifications equivalent to Table 6 Panel A column (2) except that we include additional 
interactions as specified. Column (1) is the baseline where “small” is defined as firms with less than 50 employees 
(as in Table 6). Columns (2) to (5) are based on different definitions of a “young” firm. Column (2) defines young 
to be a firm that is one year old or younger; in column (3) young = 2 years old or less, etc.  
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Table A11: Alternative ways of measuring firm-level productivity 
(1) (2) (3) 
Method of measuring TFP: Factor Share Regression MU OMEGA 
Policy Rule instrument 
-0.054 0.031 0.0103 
(0.055) (0.054) (1.377) 
Observations 
45,545 45,545 18,999 
Firms 
21,404 21,404 9,139 
Notes: These are reduced form specifications corresponding to column (2) of Panel E in Table 8. “Factor Share” 
method in column (1) reproduces the results reported in Panel E of Table 8 for reference; i.e. TFP is computed 
using a “factor share” method and relative to an industry by year average “Regression” method in column (2) 
includes (the log of) labor, materials and capital as additional control variables in a specification where the 
dependent variable is ln(revenue). “MU OMEGA” in column (3) implements the structural production function 
framework proposed in Martin (2012) which takes into account firm specific variation in market power when 
computing TFP. The exact method of construction is in the final sub-section of Appendix C. 
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Table A12: Area Level regressions – Instrumenting NGE with Rule change 
– Simple linear regression instead of ordered probit
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Method OLS Reduced Form First Stage IV 
A. Dependent variable: ln(Unemployment) 
Maximum investment 
subsidy 
-0.169*** -0.658*** 
NGE 
(0.020) (0.106) 
Policy Rule Instrument 
-0.355*** 0.539*** 
(0.056) (0.026) 
B. Dependent variable: ln(Employment) 
Maximum investment 
subsidy 
0.169*** 1.671*** 
NGE 
(0.057) (0.271) 
Policy Rule Instrument 
0.901*** 0.539*** 
(0.142) (0.026) 
C. Dependent variable: ln(Number of Plants) 
Maximum investment 
subsidy) 
0.014 0.413*** 
NGE 
(0.027) (0.112) 
Policy Rule Instrument 0.223*** 0.539*** 
(0.060) (0.026) 
Number of areas (wards) 10,737 10,737 10,737 10,737 
Observations 85,896 85,896 85,896 85,896 
Notes: *** denotes significance at the 1% level, **5% level and *10% level. NGE (“Net Grant Equivalent”) is 
the level of the maximum investment subsidy in the area. All columns include a full set of area fixed effects time 
dummies. Standard errors below coefficients are clustered by area (ward level) in all columns. The time period is 
1997-2004. This Table corresponds to Table 3, however, we use a slightly different version of the policy rule 
instrument. Instead of the ordered probit reported in Table A3, the instrument here is based on a binary Probit of 
the event “NGE>0”.  Note however, that the IV results in column 4 are very similar to those reported in Table 2. 
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Table A13: Firm level regressions with capital intensity interactions 
 Dependent variable: ln(employment) 
Rule Change 0.373*** 0.195 
(0.088) (0.121) 
Rule Change × High Capital Intensity 0.346** 
(0.176) 
Observations 94,937 94,937 
Firms 14,790 14,790 
Notes: These are specifications equivalent to column (2) of Table 8 Panel B.  Capital intensity is firm level average 
capital to labor ratio before 2000. “High capital intensity” is a dummy equal to one if capital intensity is above 
the sample median and zero otherwise. Sample is smaller than in other firm level results because firms without 
valid observations for pre 2000 capital intensity are excluded. 
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